Factors Affecting Password Manager Adoption among European University Students by Dubinina, Alina
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors Affecting Password Manager Adoption 
among European University Students 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF TURKU 
Department of Future Technologies 
Master of Science in Technology Thesis 
Security of Networked Systems 
November 2019 
Alina Dubinina 
 
Supervisors: 
Ali Farooq, MSc. 
Antti Hakkala, PhD(Tech.) 
 
 
 
The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality 
assurance system using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service. 
 
 
 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF TURKU 
Department of Future Technologies 
 
ALINA DUBININA: Factors Affecting Password Manager Adoption among 
European University Students  
 
Master of Science in Technology Thesis, 59 p., 6 app. p. 
Networked Systems Security 
November 2019 
 
 
Password is the most common method of proving the identity on various online 
services. More and more sensitive information gets stored online: banking details, 
healthcare data, educational and corporate data. Due to the increasing amount of 
accounts, users face the challenge of creating and remembering various passwords of 
high complexity. To deal with such challenges and improve password management 
practices, security professionals suggest the use of password managers, also known as 
password managers. However, this tool has not gained much popularity among the end-
users. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and examine the factors that may affect the 
adoption of password managers. In this regard, I have proposed a research model based 
on the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) and Task 
Technology Fit (TTF) models. Data (N=265) was collected from students enrolled at 
one of European universities using a online survey. For this purpose, data was collected 
using mailing lists and Facebook page of a crowdsourcing site. PLS-SEM was used to 
test the proposed model with a usable data set of N= 265.analyze the data sample 
collected with the means of a questionnaire.  
 
The results of the analysis show that performance expectancy and social influence affect 
behavioral intentions. Task technology fit, facilitating conditions, and behavioral 
intentions directly affect password manager adoptions, while performance expectancy, 
social influence, effort expectancy, and technology characteristics are the main factors 
that affect password manager adoption among European students indirectly. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Overview 
Internet is an essential part of the modern society lifestyle. More and more previously 
analog services nowadays move to the Internet, such as television, radio, mail and 
phone communication. With the increasing amount of opportunities provided by the 
online services, the number of people that try to exploit those opportunities maliciously 
grew as well. Performed cyberattacks became more difficult to prevent; they have 
become much more advanced. The concern is that with the increased number of online 
services, people started sharing their personal data across the internet. Without proper 
security measures, the information about health, banking details, private conversations 
can be exposed or stolen by cybercriminals. This means that if a personal account is 
hacked – the data loss may affect the user significantly. To protect personal information 
online, various means of authentication are provided to the users. Authentication is a 
method of proving a user identity, and it assures that the person is entitled to have 
access to the data. There are three main ways to authenticate: knowledge-based 
authentication by using a secret string communicated between the end-user and the 
system, which is commonly known as password; physical token authentication, and 
biometric authentication (Brostoff and Sasse, 2000).  
 
Passwords are a very common mean of authentication when accessing a particular web 
resource or a computer (Maclean and Ophoff, 2019). They are used to protect our 
sensitive data, such as our health data, our corporate information, banking details, and 
personal communication. Despite being the most used method of authentication, 
knowledge-based authentication has quite many flaws. The main one is human memory 
and its limited capacity. Only around seven chunks of data can be memorized, 
according to the study by Miller (1956), and there is a high risk to forget some 
information due to the increasing number of passwords people use. The common rules 
for creating a secure password are combining various types of characters: upper-case 
letters, lower-case letters, digits and special characters (Schougaard and Dragoni, 2016). 
Moreover, a complex password should be at least eight characters long, and it should 
not contain any known word. The number of different accounts and the complexity of 
passwords required by security recommendations make it challenging to remember the 
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passwords (Charoen, Raman, & Olfamn, 2008). Hence many users end up reusing the 
secret for different resources or write the passwords down on paper, which is a serious 
security risk. Moreover, there are different attacks targeted towards password 
authentication nowadays, such as phishing or credential theft (Li and Evans, 2017), so it 
is important to be aware of the necessary security measures that can prevent the loss of 
sensitive data. One of the most serious challenges is protecting against the Man-in-the-
Browser attack and keylogging since the procedure of logging into the account involves 
typing the password and the username in the browser window (Golrang, 2012). 
Keylogger is an application that tracks and detects the sequence of the keystrokes 
captured from the physical keyboard used to input the password. Some systems have a 
virtual keyboard available on the web portal, which appears in the different parts of the 
display, so the keystrokes can never be traced. However, in this case, it is easier for a 
criminal to look over the shoulder of the user and memorize the password. Moreover, 
some applications take snapshots of the screen after every mouse click of the user; such 
applications are called ‘screen grabbers’ (Golrang, 2012). The Man-in-the-Browser 
(MIBT) attack has gained its popularity due to the wide usage of the browsers for 
performing banking operations and using personal e-mail and social media accounts. 
The MITB attack method combines keystroke capturing, taking screenshots, and 
stealing credentials. It is quite challenging to protect from this type of attack due to its 
complexity. 
 
To facilitate the management of passwords, password managers were introduced. 
Password management software or password managers allow users to delegate 
generating and storing the passwords securely to the technological devices. There are 
multiple different password managers available on the market, and they can be divided 
into four major groups: desktop password manager, online and portable password 
managers (Karole et al, 2011). The first category of password managers includes those 
applications that allow the user to keep the passwords on the local machine. An online 
password manager is installed on the third-party server available across the network. 
The third category of password managers include the vaults that are installed on the 
portable device, such as USB flash drives or phones. Access to the database with 
credentials is protected by a master password, which needs to be memorized. Having to 
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remember only one password reduces the load on the user’s memory since it is only 
necessary to remember one complex password instead of various. Despite being 
described as a secure method to manage the credentials, there are still quite a lot of 
people who choose not to use the software for various reasons (Aurigemma et al, 2017).  
1.2 Study Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the factors that affect the adoption of password 
management among students in Europe. It is important because using weak passwords 
or reusing the passwords for multiple accounts poses a threat to the user’s sensitive data. 
Potential attackers can obtain data of the users by hacking their passwords. This study 
aims at understanding the decision-making behind the adoption of the password 
managers among the students. The following research questions are intended to be 
answered in this study: 
1. What is a demographic profile of a European student who (does not) use a 
password manager? 
2. What factors affect password manager adoption among the European students?  
1.3 Research Methodology and Scope of Study  
In order to answer the research questions, quantitative research was conducted. 
SmartPLS was used for the data analysis. Students are chosen as the target group of this 
research because they are the future potential employees. The increasing number of 
passwords used in daily working life makes it critical for companies to make sure their 
workers use secure methods for managing important work-related credentials. 
Moreover, the universities have a lot of internally available data such as research and 
personal data of students and poor password management may lead to security breaches 
at the universities as well. Password managers are one way of facilitating the use of 
secure passwords, thus improving the security of the systems.   
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: first, the background information on 
password managers is given in Chapter 2, including the types of password managers. 
The existing studies regarding usability and security, as well as user studies conducted 
regarding the adoption of password vaults will be discussed in detail in order to analyze 
the current gap in the research. Further, the methodology is presented in Chapter 3. 
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Various theoretical models used for the thesis research are described along with similar 
studies done in the past regarding technology adoption. A theoretical model chosen for 
the research is presented, followed by the hypotheses based on it. Finally, the results of 
the quantitative research are analyzed in Chapter 4 in order to confirm or deny the 
hypotheses and answer the research questions.  
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2 Background 
2.1 Password manager definition 
Password managers are a tool for storing and organizing passwords so that the users do 
not have to remember all the credentials they use for different accounts. Password 
managers also provide the functionality of creating passwords. The software that keeps 
all the user’s login information in a database, and provides the credentials whenever 
needed (Karole et al, 2011). The passwords are usually encrypted inside the database in 
order to enhance the level of security. There are several major types of password 
managers, but they typically share the same features: the password vault is protected by 
a master key, and if the user wants to access the credentials, it would be necessary to 
input the key to the software. 
2.2 Types of password managers 
Password managers were created to provide a tool for storing and managing passwords 
so that the users do not have to remember all the credentials they use for different 
accounts. Table 1 summarizes the types of password managers along with examples. 
Table 1. Types of password managers 
Type of password 
manager 
Vault database location Examples Source 
Browser-based 
Locally inside the 
browser 
Firefox or Chrome 
browser extensions 
Bojan, 2017 
Karole et al, 2011 
Stand-alone 
Locally on the PC as a 
separate application 
1Password, Keepass 
Cloud-based 
Remotely on a third-party 
server 
Dashlane, 1Password, 
LastPass 
Portable 
On a USB stick or mobile 
phone 
Keepass, Lazlock, 
Password Safe 
 
 
History of password managers started with the software implemented in the browsers. 
There are two types of browser-based password managers nowadays: browser-
embedded password vaults and browser plugins. Browser-embedded password 
managers have a password management feature implemented into a browser, such as 
Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, and others. The credentials are 
stored on the local PC of the user and are accessible on-demand. It is possible to have 
the credentials encrypted by using a master password. However, not all of the browsers 
use the encryption or a password for protecting the credentials. The browser plugins are 
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extensions that are installed into the browsers. Popular password managers, such as 
KeePass, Lastpass and 1Password can be installed into the browser. These password 
vaults encrypt the credentials database by using the master password provided by the 
user (Karole et al, 2011). It is possible to use password managers not only for managing 
passwords but also for storing bank credentials, credit card information and other 
sensitive data that requires protection. The browser-based password managers have a 
feature of distributing password database among the all the devices of the user, so it is 
easier to log in from different locations, nonetheless, it is necessary to be authenticated 
in the browser in order to be able to synchronize the passwords (Bojan, 2017). 
 
Further, password managers developed, and nowadays there are many different 
solutions available for the users on the market. Bojan (2017) categorizes the password 
managers into three major categories: browser-based password managers, stand-alone 
password managers and cloud-based password vaults. Password managers can also be 
categorized by the type of the device they are installed on. Karole et al (2011) classifies 
password managers into the following categories: desktop password managers, portable 
managers and online password managers Fukumitsu et al (2016) divides password 
managers into groups as follows: web-browser plugin, a mobile phone application or a 
web-based software. When password vaults only started to gain their popularity, they 
were only storing the credentials on one device, which limited the portability of such 
software. With the increasing need to log into systems from different locations, it was 
necessary to revise the password management practices, so some applications started 
offering to store the database on a remote server accessible from different locations or 
installing a portable password manager to a USB drive or a phone. Mobile password 
vaults are installed in a form of an application with a password database that is stored 
locally on a smartphone and can be accessible on-demand.  
 
The stand-alone password managers evolved from the browser-based vaults as an 
attempt to provide a more secure way of managing the credentials (Bojan,2017). The 
data in such vaults is encrypted. Stand-by password managers have a number of features 
besides storing the passwords in the database. Some of the password vaults allow the 
users to use the credentials generated by the software in compliance with the requested 
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password requirements. Moreover, password managers are able to check whether the 
passwords are secure enough. Some software allows sharing the credentials among 
different password managers and devices, and finally the password managers are able to 
analyse the security of the websites used by the individual and can prompt to change the 
password on some web portal if the site is not considered secure or if it had suffered a 
security breach (Bojan, 2017). Finally, cloud-based password managers provide the user 
with the possibility to access the password database from anywhere. It is only necessary 
for the individual to have access to internet and to the web browser in order to log into 
the cloud and start using the credentials. Moreover, the cloud provider is assuring the 
reliability of the servers: the data is usually backed up, so in case of the failure of the 
storage or the server, the user can easily recover the credentials and continue using the 
services without problems. The drawback of the online password manager is that the 
user has to trust the service provider with the credentials, and some online password 
management services do not provide the client with enough information on how their 
data is being secured (Karole et al, 2011).  
2.3 Features  and Limitations of Password Managers 
Prior to the investigation on the adoption of password managers among students, a 
systematic literature review has been completed. The difference from a regular literature 
review is that during the systematic literature review all the relevant publication and 
research is collected. Any mention of the subject in the published and unpublished 
studies makes an article or a book a subject of investigation in terms of relevance. The 
systematic literature review provides a more detailed view on the subject, and since all 
research is being identified, it reduces the possibility of bias (Nightingale, 2009).  
 
There are several steps necessary to be taken in order to conduct a proper literature 
review: first, the goal is being determined. One has to define what the objective of the 
study is, and what the main subject of the research is going to be in order to define the 
search keywords later. The second step is to decide the criteria that will serve as a basis 
for deciding whether the study will be considered as relevant. Next step is to decide on 
the manner in which the research is going to be identified, and then the analysis strategy 
is done as a final step of the systematic literature review (Nightingale, 2009). It is 
important to identify all the possible studies that were covering the subject of interest. 
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This way not only the well-known publications that reached important journals will be 
analyzed but also the articles that got less publicity. After the publications have been 
identified, it is necessary to go through the array of the articles or chapters found in 
different databases and remove the duplicates found. It is possible that one will need to 
do a search various times before collecting all the possible relevant studies. Next, the 
first screening is done, by analyzing the abstract and the title of the research, as well as 
its type. At this stage, some articles may be removed as irrelevant or not suitable for a 
scientific study, such as websites. After, it is necessary to go through the articles in-
depth and decide whether each of the publications should be kept as relevant or 
excluded with reasoning.  
 
A search string was created and adapted for different major scientific databases, and 
each of them was searched against the string. The search was done in two phases, since 
during the first phase it was identified that there are various synonyms for the term 
‘password manager’, such as ‘password vault’ and ‘password keeper’. Hence, the search 
string for the second phase of the literature review had to be modified. During the first 
phase, a total of 202 articles were found in six major scientific databases: Scopus, Web 
of Science, Google Scholar, IEEE, Science Direct and ACM. 65 duplicate entries were 
found and removed. During phase two, 26 articles were found, of which 9 were 
removed as duplicated. The next step in the systematic literature review was to identify 
the relevant studies. First, they were identified solely by the titles, then by the contents. 
A total of 62 publications were marked as relevant. It was important to go through the 
studies one more time and identify the main categories of publications. This step 
simplifies the further analysis of the literature and the shortcomings in the currently 
available research. The collected articles were later classified by the categories by major 
topics: design of password managers, usability studies, user-related studies, guidelines 
for using studies, articles related to types of password managers, review papers, and the 
unclassified studies, which include the studies that cover two or more different topics 
related to password vaults.  
 
Systematic literature review shows that there are two most popular features of password 
managers studied previously: usability and security. Nowadays password vaults include 
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several important features that are intended to provide the user with a secure and 
pleasant experience. Despite providing a user with useful features for convenient and 
secure password management, different types of password vaults have certain 
limitations. There are concerns about the protection of the sensitive data ensured by the 
password manager provider and the operating system of the mobile device in case of 
portable password vaults. Furthermore, consumers are concerned by the fact that the 
application might be sharing sensitive data with the third-party, which might collect 
sensitive information about the users. The mobile password managers do not often 
provide the users with any additional features besides storing usernames and passwords, 
so the user cannot store the credit card data or banking information. Finally, the 
embedded password managers do not allow the user to switch between devices, so if the 
individual was to log into a system from another smartphone, there is no possibility to 
access the password database. An online vault is accessible from different workstations 
if the network access is configured. However, use of it requires the trust of the user to 
outsource the storage of the passwords to a third-party server. The transparency and 
security are not always guaranteed by the service provider. Moreover, the encrypted 
password is transmitted across the public network, which poses a risk of the traffic 
being captured by a hacker. It is possible to decrypt the passwords by using a brute-
force attack because the master password might be poorly created. Furthermore, a 
malicious entity can gain access to multiple databases of passwords in case the server is 
hacked. Even though the credentials are encrypted, it is not guaranteed that they will not 
get decrypted. Portable password managers seem more trusted since the user has full 
control over the management of the portable device where the passwords are stored. 
Nevertheless, mobile vaults do not allow copying the passwords directly into the 
password text field, so the user must manually input the credentials. This results in a 
lack of usability. USB portable managers help avoid the necessity of typing the 
passwords manually, however, the users might not always have USB accessible as 
easily as a mobile phone (Karole et al, 2011).  
 
Human memory capacity is limited; therefore, it is complicated to follow the guidelines 
of creating long and complicated diverse passwords. The general principle of browser-
based password manager operation is described as follows: each time the individual 
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creates an entry about a new webpage into the software, it is necessary to input the link 
of the website, the username, and the password (Fukumitsu et al, 2016). The 
information entered by the user is further encrypted. The database is encrypted with the 
use of the master password that the user has to create. Browser-based password 
managers automatically inject the credentials one the individual visits the page that is 
included in the database. Master password, in this case, it becomes the single point of 
failure, which compromises the security of the software. The mitigation strategy 
suggested by Fukumitsu et al (2016) is to use a method of two-factor authentication: a 
security token. Since the master password is created by a human, it might not comply 
with the security guidelines and compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the 
password manager database. Hence, a token may provide an additional level of security. 
However, the token is not protected against the human error: people tend to leave the 
token at convenient places near the PC, which allows the potential attacker to take 
ownership over the token and hack the password database (Fukumitsu et al, 2016).  
 
Several password vault prototypes have been suggested by researchers that were aimed 
at offering various solutions in terms of usability and security, as well as functionality. 
The proposal by McCarney et al (2012) suggests that the mobile phone can be used as a 
security token, and an additional asset in order to separate the key used to decrypt the 
data and the encrypted database. The main shortcoming of the proposed model is that in 
case the smartphone is lost, it is not possible to recover the data. Fukumitsu et al (2016) 
raise concerns about the security and usability of password managers. The suggestion 
described by Fukumitsu et al (2016) is to enhance the model by McCarney et al (2012). 
The scheme involves a personally assigned server, a user’s PC and a smartphone. First, 
it is important to set up secure communication such as TLS in order not to send plain 
text data between the devices. Second, the user is required to create a strong enough 
server password. Even though there is a human error involved, the fact that the server is 
only a part of the whole schema reduces the risk of the data loss if the user discloses the 
password or makes it too easy to hack. The password manager design was further 
revised against the UDS model: usability, deployability, and security (Bonneau et al, 
2012). In terms of usability, the proposed model has an easy way to recover the data in 
case the smartphone is lost, or the server password is forgotten. The deployability is 
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imperfect due to the fact that it is quite expensive since it requires the installations of 
three devices. Furthermore, it is necessary to configure the browser to meet the 
requirements for the installation of the password manager proposed in the study 
(Fukumitsu et al, 2016). Finally, the security advantages are quite strong, because there 
are three parties involved, so it makes it more difficult for the attacker to hack the 
passwords. The shortcoming of this password manager is the deployability of it. There 
should be improvements done on the way the password manager is installed and 
configured.  
 
Stobert and Biddle (2014) discuss different password management techniques in detail. 
They mention graphical passwords, which could be a good alternative solution to the 
problem of password management. The study claims that using pictures instead of 
character sequence is better due to the fact that humans are better at remembering 
graphical information than text. The adoption of a graphical password is not wide, 
however, there is a potential for them to get more popular throughout the years. There 
are various implementations of such authentication method, for example, a dot sequence 
on Android devices for unlocking the screen. Windows also provides the users with an 
opportunity to sign in using a picture. There are however drawbacks when using a 
graphical password. there are certain areas which the users are more likely to be 
selected as a part of the pattern. The workaround for this problem is using a pattern 
created randomly. The paper suggests a cued graphical password. The idea is to provide 
the user with a memorable clue in order to recall the credentials. One of the variations 
of the cues is the secret questions that normally serve as help for the users to reset the 
password. An example of a graphical password manager mentioned by Stobert and 
Biddle (2014), is PassTiles. The software allows the user to log into the system by 
clicking a sequence of tiles in a grid. When the individual creates the password, the tiles 
get charted, so that the sequence can be remembered. The user chooses the tiles on the 
basis of a picture; however, the image is always different and randomly generated. The 
proposed design can help avoid the phishing attack due to the fact that it is complicated 
for the hacker to obtain the information about the password when it is graphics-based.  
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2.4 Security Issues of Password Managers 
The security of password managers is the main feature of password vaults. It is 
important to provide the users with the features that will protect their sensitive data 
from being stolen or compromised. Li and Evans (2017) classify the vulnerabilities of 
password managers into two main categories: client-side and server-side. Client-side 
vulnerabilities are network-related or user-related, while server-side affect the password 
vault itself whereas server vulnerabilities affect the password database. The authors of 
the aforementioned article state that there are four goals that the password managers 
need to pursue as a software in order to remain secure. First of all, it is crucial for a 
password vault to protect the account’s security. Furthermore, the credentials database 
has to stay secured. The accounts of collaborators have to keep their integrity. Finally, 
there should not be any possibility for the credentials’ leak, such as applications 
intercepting and capturing the credentials.  
2.4.1 Function-Specific Vulnerabilities 
Several functions of password managers were discovered to be vulnerable to various 
exploits. Li and Evans (2017) open a discussion about the security of password 
managers in practice. The research is aiming at identifying the risks associated with the 
use of password managers, especially poorly secured ones, as well as highlighting the 
guidelines on how to use the vaults properly in order to benefit from them. Security of 
the software is studied in-depth: there were several attacks performed in order to 
investigate the possible vulnerabilities and find out how severe the risks of using 
password managers can be. The features of the password managers that were being 
studied include encryption on the client-side, a possibility of autofill and having single-
use passwords (Li and Evans, 2017). The study mentions the autofill vulnerabilities and 
the fact that it is possible to obtain the credentials by using a script. Javascript functions 
can be exploited, and password managers lack the functionality of detecting the 
legitimacy of the scripts, hence there is a risk of the data loss. Moreover, Li and Evans 
(2017) claim that there may be bugs in the client scripts, that exposed the users to the 
attacks. The hacker could exploit LastPass and obtain user credentials through a non-
legitimate domain URL because the password manager did not correctly recognize the 
domain from the URL. 
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Further into the investigation, in order to research the security of password managers in-
depth, Li and Evans (2017) focus on four main vulnerabilities of the applications: the 
user interface vulnerability, authorization vulnerability, web and bookmarklet 
vulnerabilities. The user interface vulnerabilities involve phishing: if the password gets 
stolen during the phishing attack, it can compromise the confidentiality and integrity of 
the entire password database. Bookmarklets were studied, and vulnerabilities were 
discovered in all the showcases mentioned in the article. The attacker can create a 
malicious page, and in case the individual uses this feature for logging in on such a 
page, the hacker gets an opportunity to steal the credentials. XSS and CSRF are the 
common vulnerabilities that affect password managers. Regarding the authorization 
vulnerability, it is related to the feature of collaboration provided by some of the 
password vaults. Some password vaults, such as My1login, give an opportunity of 
granting certain permissions for different users so that there is a better control over the 
access to credentials. Authorization allows a more granular control yet a possibility for 
several users to collaborate in terms of managing passwords. The software might 
provide the excessive authorization rights to a user that is not supposed to have them. 
With the help of a script, a user can obtain unauthorized access to shared credentials. 
Finally, Li and Evans (2017) suggest the strategies on how to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities associated with the use of password managers. It is important to know 
the risks and how to overcome them when using password vaults because, with the 
provided advantages of the software, one can improve the security practices 
dramatically. Regarding the bookmarklet vulnerability, the authors suggest not to use 
the click authentication functionality. Content Security Policy is said to be a tool to 
protect against XSS. The CSRF issue is recommended to be fixed by the developers of 
the password managers by including a function of checking the Refer and Origin 
headers of each and every request. 
 
There are several ways the password vaults are storing the credentials: locally on a 
device, such as a standalone password manager installed onto a PC, on a portable device 
such as mobile phone, or in the cloud at a third-party server. One of the types of 
standalone password managers is browser-based vault. Bojan (2017) presented the 
security evaluation of browser extension password managers. The study described 
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various attacks that are possible to be executed on the browser-based password 
managers due to their specific features. There are several serious security concerns 
raised by Bojan (2017) regarding browser-based password managers. Seemingly secure 
due to the encryption and password protection, the password databases provided by 
Chrome are accessible by some third-party Chrome applications. They present a 
potential security breach risk because it is possible for them to obtain passwords 
without authorization. Moreover, this might be done without the user being aware of the 
credentials being stolen. Further, the devices in possession of the user might be stolen, 
and it is possible to guess the password by dictionary attack if it is not very 
complicated. Master password acts as a single point of failure in browser-based 
passwords, so Bojan (2017) suggests that the security of such password vaults should be 
improved.  
 
Numerous attacks can be performed by exploiting the automatic auto-fill. Sweep attacks 
allow hackers to obtain the credentials of the users by using iframes that were displayed 
in the browser pages. The password vaults do not recognize that the iframe is malicious, 
and thus the attackers can capture the auto-filled credentials that are inserted there 
instead of the legitimate site’s sign-in window. Besides the iFrame sweep attack, a 
Window sweep attack exists. In this case, the password manager will insert the 
password into the pop-up window that appears on a webpage, and the attacker later 
collects and uses those credentials. Another variety of sweep attack is the redirect sweep 
attack. The attacker hijacks the webpage so that the attempt to log into a service leads to 
a redirection to a third-party page. Hackers have the skills to obtain the credentials by 
making the third-party page look legitimate, so the credential theft would happen 
without the user realizing that the password manager automatically fills in the login 
form of a malicious website. Even if the user reacts on time and leaves the dangerous 
page, the password is already stolen by the attacker (Bojan, 2017). Auto-fill feature was 
studied in relation to mobile password vaults as well. Li and Evans (2017) describe a 
method of implementing auto-fill functionality in portable password managers. It is a 
script that creates a bookmarklet, and when run, it gives the user an opportunity to insert 
the password into the login window. Manual auto-fill functionality is vulnerable to 
clickjacking, an attack that is carried out by the hacker with the help of including 
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various layers onto the page that the user might click instead of the original page. The 
example page has a legitimately looking form that had a hidden iframe that captured the 
passwords with the help of an overlying form. The mitigation of the vulnerability is 
frame busting, x-frame-options header, and content-security policies, provided by the 
web browsers. The mitigation strategy for such types of attack is disabling auto-fill 
feature due to the possibility of it to be exploited.  
2.4.2 Other Security Vulnerabilities 
The study conducted by Bojan (2017) focuses on the security of the KEY browser 
extension developed by F-Secure company. The testing showcased that the browser 
extension has multiple vulnerabilities that need to be paid attention to. Those 
vulnerabilities include improper domain matching, authorization code hack, Man in the 
Middle attack, unvalidated redirects, credential theft (Bojan, 2017). Password managers 
are able to detect the web page for which there is an entry in the password database. It is 
necessary to control this feature because it can be exploited. The URL of the domain is 
not strictly checked against; hence an attacker can disguise a malicious website, so its 
URL resembles a legitimate one. If the user does not notice the difference in the URLs, 
then the attacker has a chance to obtain the credentials if the user by accident chooses to 
fill in the form as prompted by the password manager.  
 
Mobile vaults several security flaws. Boukayoua (2014) states that the security in the 
Android-based password vaults is compromised due to the fact that the clipboard is not 
hidden from any application installed on the device. The study proposes the way of 
copying the password from the vault into the application as a complete set of characters 
bypassing the Android clipboard. This is done to improve the security aspect of the 
password manager. Graphical passwords have security limitations as well. The 
graphical password manager ImageTiles is vulnerable to the capture attack. A potential 
hacker can record the clicks the user does when logging in. The password manager itself 
does not identify which tiles were clicked on logon, however, with the help of camera 
the sequence of tiles can be obtained. Since the password does not change after every 
login, it is possible to verify the sequence of the tiles, and thus hack the user’s account. 
However, the graphical passwords are highly resistant to a phishing attack. (Stobert and 
Biddle, 2014). Cloud-based password vaults have also been studied in terms of security. 
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The security of such password managers relies on the third-party. The cloud is 
accessible from multiple locations over the Internet, hence there is a risk of data loss 
initiated from different parts of the world. There was an attack on LastPass carried out 
in 2015 (Vinton, 2015) that resulted in significant data loss (as cited in Li and Evans, 
2017), As reported by the LastPass representatives the hackers obtained access to the 
password database of the company, and the credentials and other sensitive data of the 
customers was compromised. The attackers managed to steal the passwords, the e-
mails, the salts and the reminders used for password recovery. During the leakage of the 
data from LastPass password storage, the cryptographic hashes were stolen as well, and 
this could lead to the attackers being able to attempt the decryption of the credentials. 
The common mitigation strategy implemented by the password vault companies against 
such types of attacks is not to keep the master password but to use a slow key derivation 
function. Such a method makes it complicated for an attacker to perform a brute force 
or a dictionary attack on the encrypted credentials.  
Table 2 presents a summary of common attacks on password managers. 
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Table 2. Attacks on password managers 
Affected feature Attack type Mitigation Source 
Autofill 
iFrame sweep attack, 
window sweep attack, 
redirect sweep attack, 
clickjacking 
Disabling autofill feature, 
frame busting, x-frame-
options header, content 
security policies 
Bojan, 2017 
Li and Evans, 
2017 
Domain detection 
Improper domain 
matching 
Making sure the URL of 
the domain is legitimate 
before inserting the 
credentials prompted by the 
password manager 
Bojan, 2017 
 
Android clipboard 
Credential theft by a 
third-party application 
Bypassing the android 
clipboard 
Boukayoua, 2014 
Master secret Master key theft 
Creating a complex master 
secret using multi-factor 
authentication for vault 
Li and Evans, 
2017 
Authorization 
Excessive rights for 
unauthorized users 
Proper configuration of the 
software and vulnerability 
fixes from development 
Li and Evans, 
2017 
Bookmarklet 
Malicious page 
masqueraded as 
legitimate 
Avoiding click 
authentication 
Li and Evans, 
2017 
Use of vaults for 
authentication in 
WWW 
XSS attack, CSRF 
vulnerability 
Content security policy, 
checking Refer and Origin 
headers of the requests, 
needs to be implemented 
by developers 
Li and Evans, 
2017 
Chrome browser 
password manager 
Attack through a third-
party Chrome application 
Avoiding third-party 
application in Chrome 
Bojan, 2017 
Graphical 
password 
management 
Capture attack 
Ensuring there is nobody 
overlooking the clicks and 
is not recording the 
movement of the mouse 
Stobert and 
Biddle, 2014 
Third-party storage Credential theft 
Slow key derivation 
function to protect the 
client credentials against 
decryption, biometric 
authentication, two-factor 
authentication 
Yang et al, 2014 
 
 
The research conducted by Yang et al (2014) suggests that besides using the master 
password to protect the vault, alternative solutions with a more enhanced security are 
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available. Biometrics and two-factor authentication provide the users with a multi-
layered security solution to protect the credentials stored in password managers. 
However, the study focuses primarily on the cloud-based password vaults, where some 
of the tokens and biometric features are not compatible. Moreover, biometric 
authentication raises concerns about privacy. Some people do not want to provide the 
biometric identifiers to a third party.  
2.4.3 Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies 
Various solutions were presented by different studies in order to enhance the security of 
password managers without compromising usability. The study by Yang et al (2014) is 
aiming at investigating whether it is possible to combine the security, ease of use and 
privacy options in order to deliver a cloud-based password manager solution that would 
satisfy the needs of the users. In order to achieve that, a scheme has been suggested with 
the implementation of Single Sign-On and Biometric Template Protection, or BTP. The 
technic of biometric data protection is aimed at the privacy of such data, for example, 
retina or fingerprints. BTP changes the biometrics so that it is saved in a form of a 
secured template by using a particular function with the help of a key that is assigned to 
the user.  The suggestion of Yang et al (2014) is to implement biometric authentication 
method as a part of the two-factor authentication. First, the user will need to input a 
master secret, and as a second step, the biometrics will be matched against the ones 
stored in the database. The process is intended to be done as a whole, to eliminate the 
opportunity for the attacker to learn which of the steps led to a failure in authentication. 
Moreover, the manner storing of both the biometric information and the master key is 
ensuring that in case one of the authentication keys is stolen, the other will preserve 
secured. Finally, the study claims that the password manager using such type of two-
factor authentication can be done in combination with the scalability and accessibility of 
the cloud-based password managers. The authors (Yang et al, 2014) are hoping that the 
suggested model can enhance the security of cloud-based password vaults without 
compromising the usability of them.  
 
In an attempt to develop a secure online password manager, Englert and Shah (2009) 
conducted a research in which they presented a software that gives an opportunity for 
the user to save their credentials in an online database securely. The vault is claimed to 
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be convenient due to its accessibility from across the network. Moreover, the credentials 
are transmitted over the internet in an encrypted way in order for the attackers not to be 
able to capture the traffic and obtain the passwords of the users. The Greeting 
mechanism is being introduced as a method to prevent phishing attacks on the system. 
A list of ‘known’ or ‘trusted’ hosts are provided by the user to the server, and thus the 
access is limited by the configured IP addresses. When the user accesses the server from 
an authorized location, a greeting message is shown, and if it is recognized by the user, 
then the next step is to go to the page. The design by Englert and Shah (2009) suggests 
that the user would have to provide three variables: username, password, and a secret 
key. Moreover, it will be necessary to report whether the source computer is intended 
for personal or public use, in order to be able to decide whether to add the IP of it to the 
trusted hosts on the server.  
 
The design suggested by Englert and Shah (2009) is expected to protect the user against 
phishing. This type of attack is aiming at obtaining user’s credentials through a page 
that looks exactly like the original one (Englert and Shah, 2009). The attacker is 
designing a page so that the user thinks that it is an original one, and therefore enters the 
credentials. The domain name might resemble the legitimate one, and the design of the 
page makes the user think that it is safe to input the credentials. However, if there is a 
custom greeting message presented to the user, it is possible to realize when the website 
is legitimate or not, thus eliminating the risk of providing the credentials to fake 
webpages.  It depends solely on how attentive the user is because an attacker might 
attempt to present a default or a similar kind of a greeting message or eliminate it 
completely. Setting the trusted hosts eliminates the chances of the adversary to be able 
to see the customized greeting message, therefore it will be almost impossible to create 
a message similar to the original one in order to trick the user into providing the 
credentials. Such a solution of a password manager is designed to mitigate multiple 
attacks by providing a complex design that allows the user to set up limited access to 
the database. 
2.5 Usability Issues of Password Managers 
A common desire of users is to have convenience in their everyday life (Schougaard et 
al 2016). Various studies have been conducted on the usability of different password 
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managers. Moreover, multiple prototypes have been proposed in an attempt to improve 
the usability of password managers without compromising the security of the software. 
Table 3 presents the common usability concerns regarding password managers. 
 
Table 3. Usability concerns of password managers 
Functionality Usability concern 
Suggested 
improvement 
Source 
Accessibility 
Possibility to access the 
password manager from 
various locations 
The use of cloud-based 
password managers 
Schougaard et al, 2016 
Authorization 
Allowing multiple users 
to access the database 
without compromising 
security 
Authorization hierarchy Li and Evans, 2017 
Organization 
Being able to easily 
locate the needed 
credentials 
Structuring and 
organizing the 
credentials 
Schougaard et al, 2016 
Device compatibility 
Installing the same 
software on different 
devices and operating 
systems 
Cross-platform 
password manager 
Schougaard et al, 2016 
Control over 
credentials in the 
cloud 
The opportunity of fully 
administering own 
credentials 
Private cloud with full 
administrator rights 
Schougaard et al, 2016 
Development of 
password vault 
The opportunity of 
developing the 
password manager 
according to the needs 
Providing the user with 
opensource and licenses 
needed for developing 
the software 
Schougaard et al, 2016 
Help with password 
requirement 
compliance 
User needs to have real-
time control over the 
password creation to 
meet the requirements 
Showing the amount of 
characters while the 
user is entering them 
Tannen et al, 2019 
Case-sensitivity 
Case-sensitivity leads to 
many mistakes and 
worsens the user 
experience 
Removing case 
sensitivity 
Tannen et al, 2019 
 
There are certain requirements for the security software to be considered usable: 
acknowledging the requirements that need to be completed in order to ensure the 
security of the performed tasks, having an understanding how to achieve the successful 
completion of the tasks without completing any errors, feeling comfortable when 
operating the software Chiasson and Oorschot (2006). In addition, the study (Chiasson 
and Oorschot, 2006) suggests that it is equally important to make sure the users 
understand whether the task has been accomplished and getting the information about 
the system status. The main goal of the authors is to raise awareness of how lack of 
usability might compromise password security in very serious ways. The problems 
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regarding usability in password managers not only prevent the users from adopting 
them but also when the technology is used incorrectly, it can harm the security even 
more. The study suggests that there should be a more thorough study done that would 
help understand how the usability problems can be solved, and possibly have a 
developed prototype of a password vault that has the usability shortcomings addressed 
and fixed. Table 3 summarizes the findings related to the usability of password 
managers. 
2.5.1 Usability and Accessibility 
The advancement of technology and society led to the need of the password database to 
be accessible from multiple devices and locations, which further led to the use of cloud-
based vault. The study conducted by Schougaard et al (2016) focuses on the cloud-
based password vaults, as they suggest better accessibility of the password database. 
However, there are a few shortcomings of such a solution. The aforementioned research 
describes the main functional requirements of the cloud-based password vaults, which 
include accessibility as the main function. Moreover, it is necessary to have a 
hierarchical authorization structure, so that different users have different access rights to 
the database. Furthermore, there is a need for a convenient organizational structure, so it 
is easy to find the necessary credentials and achieve good user experience. The database 
should be cross-platform, so the user is able to access the database from any type of 
device and using different software. There is a need to have the functionality of doing 
various operations with passwords, and it is absolutely essential for the credentials to be 
encrypted, so it is not possible for an attacker to obtain the sensitive information of the 
user (Schougaard et al, 2016). The study also suggests that there are several non-
functional requirements that need to be considered in a cloud-based password manager. 
It is important for the user to store the passwords in the systems where they can have 
full administration rights. Such a system as a private cloud is an appropriate solution in 
this case. The authors (Schougaard et al, 2016) also argue that the user would benefit 
from a possibility to develop the password management system. Hence, the opensource 
and licensed software could be a valuable asset for the cloud-based password vault. 
There may be a further need for the user to increase the amount of entries in the 
database by a significant amount, therefore among other non-functional requirements, 
Schougaard et al (2016) mention the scalability. The authors also mention the 
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standardization such as setting encryption and latency requirements for the 
improvement of password vault security and user experience. 
 
The aforementioned study by Schougaard et al (2016) covered 14 major cloud-based 
password managers. The analysis showcased how those password vaults fulfill the 
functional and non-functional requirements. The shortcomings of the studied software 
were that most of the products were oriented towards corporate use rather than 
individual adoption. The suggestion was made by the authors of the study to allow the 
users to have a personal folder available under their own credentials where they could 
store and manage their personal passwords. Most of the vendors were reported to 
provide the users the possibility to operate the software on different platforms according 
to their preference. However, this was mostly possible for the password manager 
service rather than the actual database. Finally, Schougaard et al (2016) concluded that 
none of the cloud-based password vaults fulfilled the initially stated requirements that 
were claimed to help achieve better usability and user experience. The authors argue 
that there is no perfect cloud-based password manager available currently on the 
market, even though the portability and accessibility of such vaults have a significant 
positive impact on the usability and user experience.  
2.5.2 Usability and Software Adoption 
A brief study of Tannen et al (2019) discusses the usability of four password managers 
from different vendors. A group of professional usability testers analyzed the vaults 
against thirteen criteria. The study was aimed at investigating the aspects that influence 
the user experience and successful adoption of password managers. A set of tasks was 
required to be completed from the participants of the study with the help of password 
managers. The tasks included logging in, changing the password, creating security 
questions for password recoveries, and synchronization of the credentials among 
different platforms and systems. The study claims that usability testing resulted in 25 
suggested usability improvements. Some of them were described more specifically, 
such as showing a real-time amount of characters while the user is in the process of 
creating the password. This feature is expected to help the users see whether the 
requirement regarding the password length is met. Furthermore, the testers suggested to 
remove the case-sensitivity from the passwords. It is expected that case-sensitivity is a 
  23 
feature that increases the chances of the users to forget or mistype the credentials. 
However, the drawback of removing such functionality affecting the security and the 
complexity of passwords, since there are fewer character combinations (Tannen et al, 
2019). The study suggests that it is challenging yet possible to combine the usability 
and security. In some cases, however, improvements aiming at ease of use might be 
implemented at an expense of security.  
 
A study conducted by Chiasson and Oorschot (2006) investigates the usability of two 
password managers, PwdHash and Password Multiplier. A total of 26 users participated 
in the research, where they were prompted to perform different tasks with the password 
vaults and the feedback was collected afterward. Moreover, the researchers observed the 
non-verbal reaction of the participants. The same tasks were requested to be completed 
on both password managers. Prior to the testing, the researchers collected the 
background data from the participants related to their security practices online, and how 
they operate their passwords. The study suggested four different tasks to be performed 
during the testing phase: setting up entries in the password manager for the future use, 
logging into a system with the help of the password vault, complete the procedure of 
changing the password for some account, and access the accounts from a different 
location than the primary device. While the users completed the required operations, a 
dedicated examiner was observing how they react to the tasks. There were five main 
categories of the result of each operation: 1) successful completion of the task, 2) 
dangerous success that meant that the user struggled to complete the task,3) failure, 4) 
false completion that meant that the user thought the task was completed successfully, 
whereas, in reality, the task failed to be completed, 5)and the last category is failure due 
to an incorrect completion of a previous task.  
 
The study indicated that there was quite a low success rate for performing the requested 
tasks. Four out of five tasks were completed with the success rate below 50%, which 
raises a serious concern regarding the usability of the studied password managers. The 
examiners were carefully following the emotions and reactions of the participants, 
which is expected to help understand the causes of failures better. The research claims 
that users had difficulties with activation of the software, and they also misunderstood 
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how the security functionality was implemented in the password manager. The 
participants were often mistakenly considering that their actions were benefitting to the 
security, although they have failed to change their weak credentials to more secured 
ones. The false perception of security could harm the users and result in a serious data 
loss. Moreover, the participants falsely assumed that the passwords were regenerated 
every time they enabled the password managers. The usability issues discovered 
throughout the research were caused both by the password vaults and by the poor design 
of the websites that were involved in the study. Thus, the researchers argue that there 
are environmental factors that can seriously impact the user experience in a negative 
way when an individual decides to use the password manager. There was also 
inconsistency observed regarding the naming convention for usernames, thus the 
participants of the study had doubts when using the interface of a password vault and 
the websites. Multiple cases of users being frustrated with the software complexity were 
reported and observed. The participants did not feel that they had control over their 
passwords since they were not available for the users to be created or seen. This 
functionality is assumed to be preventing the participants from sharing the credentials in 
a less secure way, for example writing them down on a piece of paper. Lack of trust was 
mentioned in the research as well: people claimed that they had difficulties relying on 
software when dealing with such a sensitive topic as personal credentials and protecting 
sensitive data. The feelings reported by the participants of the study and security 
recommendations are opposite to each other. The users reported that they have no 
doubts managing their passwords securely in an alternative way than using a specially 
developed software.  
2.5.3 Usability and Security 
The research described by Chiasson and Oorschot (2006) points out an important fact: 
sometimes lack of usability can lead to serious problems with security. If the users do 
not understand how the password vault works, they might accidentally expose 
themselves to an attack. The participants of the study repeatedly forgot how to activate 
the password vaults. Some users failed to change the passwords, so they ended up 
reusing their old credentials. Moreover, some participants were not able to activate the 
software, and they were trying to recall their credentials. With the help of a phishing 
attack, a hacker would get an opportunity to obtain several variations of passwords the 
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participants had in mind, hence expanding the database of possible credentials that 
could help get access to some account of the user. Finally, the participants were 
observed to be in favor of easy-to-guess passwords due to the fact that they relied on the 
complete security of a password manager as a mechanism that would protect their 
credentials from being stolen.  
 
There are password managers created specifically for mobile devices, and usability of 
such kind of vaults is more challenging due to a smaller size of the screen (Boukayoua 
et al, 2014). Moreover, the user has to switch between applications when using the 
password manager, in order to input the password from one application to another. 
Chiasson and Oorschot (2006) suggest various improvements for the usability of 
password managers in order to improve the user experience and assure the secure usage 
of the technology. First and foremost, the users must understand when their credentials 
are being secured. The individual should also understand whether the software is on or 
he needs to perform some actions in order to trigger it; the actions have to be easily 
understood by the user as well. It must be clear for the people who decide to take up 
using password vaults, how to change and move the credentials from and to password 
manager, and if the user commits a mistake when using the software, there should be 
short and clear cues how to avoid or correct the error. Finally, it is important to provide 
the users with more transparency regarding whether the credentials for certain accounts 
are being secured. The authors claim that the satisfaction and acceptance are the key 
factors that are affected by usability.  
2.6 User studies on Password Managers 
There have been previously conducted studies in relation to the adoption of password 
managers among different target groups of people. The study by Fagan et al (2017) 
focuses on the principal reasons for the users to adopt or not to adopt the password 
managers for the regular use. The purpose of the study was to address the concerns of 
the non-users towards the adoption of the tool by identifying the main reasons why they 
choose not to use the software for managing their passwords. The findings lead to an 
assumption that many users do not have a full understanding of the password managers’ 
functionality. Those who do not use password managers claim that the tool lacks 
security, due to the fact that all the passwords are obtainable in case the hacker gets the 
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password manager unlocked. The research identified that the users of the password 
managers claimed to use more accounts and use them more frequently. Moreover, the 
respondents that have more passwords, reported that they find password managers 
useful.  
 
There was an open question asked in the study by Fagan et al (2017) in order to identify 
why users decide not to choose password managers to manage their passwords. For 
users, the main reasons in favor of using password managers are convenience – 80% 
respondents, security – nearly 25%, and 1% of responses were classified as ‘Other’. The 
non-users reported lack of need – nearly 42% of the responses, lack of time and 
motivation – nearly 11%, and inconvenience and lack of usability – 9% of responses. 
The study does not cover the difference between the people who had never heard of 
password managers, and those people who knew about the software but decided not to 
use it. It is an important shortcoming because the people who do not know about 
password managers might decide to use it later once they get familiarized with 
technology.  
 
Another study conducted regarding the password managers was done by Arias-
Cabarcos et al (2016). The research is based on the four most popular password 
managers: LastPass, KeePass, Dashlane, 1Password. They were analyzed from the 
perspective of usability and security. The study concludes that the security and the 
usability tests were rather positive, which points out the potentially successful adoption 
of the password managers in the foreseen future. The further studies suggested by the 
paper are the ways to implement the password managers’ use in companies by enforcing 
it through the security policies, combining SSO and password managers, and eventually 
improving the usability of the password managers. Another major suggestion in the 
paper is developing a software that could evaluate the security of the password 
managers in order to assess the possible vulnerabilities and risks related to the use of the 
software. The further direction from the study could be investigating further on the 
effect of usability and security on an intention to use adopt the password managers, and 
the further adoption of the technology for daily use.  
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Aurigemma et al (2017) analyzed the adoption of password managers as well. The 
paper discusses the reasons why the users do not choose password managers to store 
their passwords and why the software is not widely adopted despite its acknowledged 
functionality and benefits. The following main factors that prevented the users from 
adopting the password managers were identified after the study (Aurigemma et al, 
2017): 
 
1. Insufficient Time: respondents claimed that they did not want to dedicate some 
time specifically to install and configure the password manager 
2. Excessive Effort Expected: the users claimed that it takes an extra effort to use 
the password manager on every login 
3. Lack of Immediacy: the respondents did not start using the technology even 
though they intended to, because they got distracted, and eventually forgot to 
come back to try the new technology out. 
4. Low Self-efficacy: the respondents were unsure if they are skilled enough to 
perform the password manager installation and be able to use it 
5. Threat Apathy: the users do not acknowledge the severity of risks related to poor 
password management 
6. Alternative Solution: many respondents have chosen a different method to 
manage their passwords, which does not involve an application dedicated to it 
7. Lack of Trust: participants did not want to rely on the security of the password 
managers. 
8. Insufficient Awareness: the respondents have not obtained enough information 
previously in order to decide on whether to adopt the password managers for 
their everyday use or not. 
The paper further divides the above factors into three main groups: individual inhibitors 
– insufficient time, lack of immediacy, excessive effort, and low self-efficacy; threat 
apathy and technology inhibitors – alternative solution, lack of trust, and insufficient 
awareness. 
 
The research by Aurigemma et al (2017) is intended to raise awareness of the users 
regarding the security risks associated with poor password management, as well as 
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creating a framework to provide the users with an effective training on installation and 
use of the password managers in order to eliminate the factors of time insufficiency and 
lack of immediacy. The article also discusses the possibility to reduce security issues by 
adopting the password managers widely, so it is important to understand the factors that 
prevent users from doing so.  
 
Maclean and Ophoff (2019) conducted a study on factors preventing the users from 
adopting password managers. The research was done with the help of UTAUT2 model 
and targeted people working in the field of IT and technology, as well as students and 
staff at one of the South African universities. It was discovered that performance 
expectancy, as well as habit and trust, are the main aspects that lead to the people’s 
intention to adopt password managers. However, the study did not include the 
correlation between the factors and the actual adoption of the software, only the 
behavioral intentions was taken into consideration. 
2.7 Theoretical Models Related to Technology Adoption  
Technology adoption is quite a popular topic nowadays due to the fact that there are 
multiple technology-based services available for users, and developers need to 
understand which areas need to be paid attention to in order to make their product more 
attractive for the end-user. Technology adoption refers to the process of using a certain 
technology for carrying out particular tasks (Ferratt and Vlahos, 1998). It is necessary to 
take into consideration many factors that affect the use of technology. According to 
Chinchor et al. (2012), the evaluation of the technology effectiveness should be based 
on a combination of different factors besides, the study suggests that the factors that 
lead to the technology adoption go beyond usability. An important question regarding 
technology adoption in the context of security is whether the behavioral intentions lead 
to the adoption of security practices. Egelman et al (2016) studied the relationship 
between the desire of the users to follow certain security practices and the actual degree 
to which the individuals adopted the security behavior. The outcome is limited in scope 
but points to the conclusion that it is highly likely that the behavioral intentions actually 
lead to the user adopting security practices. The thesis research will be focusing on 
behavioral intentions and adoption of the password managers, in order to find out what 
aspects influence the behavioral intentions, and furthermore, whether the intentions 
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have an actual effect on the further adoption of the software by the students in Europe. 
There is a need for a complex approach to the problem, in order to identify the reasons 
why an individual would decide to use or not to use a certain technology for daily 
operations. There have been multiple theoretical models developed in relation to the 
technology adoption. However, as discovered during the literature review, there was no 
study previously done on password manager adoption by using any of the theoretical 
models tailored for technology adoption. 
2.7.1 United Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology 
United Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology was defined by Venkatesh et al 
(2003). The UTAUT model derived from the Technology Acceptance Model, or TAM 
(Davis, 1989), and is now the most well-known and popular variation of TAM. The 
UTAUT model combines TAM, Theory of Planned Behaviour and Innovation 
Diffusion Theory, social cognitive theory and motivation model (Negahban and Chung, 
2014). The model consists of four major constructs, such as performance expectancy, 
effort expectancy, social influence and facilitating conditions (see Figure 1). These 
variables are independent of each other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model also takes into consideration the motivation of the individual, both internal 
and external (Negahban and Chung, 2014).  
 
 
Performance 
Expectancy 
Effort 
Expectancy 
Social Influence 
Facilitating 
Conditions 
Behavioural 
Intentions 
Adoption 
Figure 1. UTAUT model 
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Different researchers have defined UTAUT constructs differently. Synthesis of such 
definitions are given in Table 4.  
Table 4. UTAUT constructs 
Construct Definition Source 
Performance 
Expectancy 
“Degree to which an individual believes that using the 
system will help him or her to attain in job 
performance” 
Venkatesh et al, 2013 
“The extent to which individuals are convinced by the 
fact that utilizing the system will help them to achieve 
benefits in the execution of their job” 
Magsamen-Conrad et 
al, 2015 
“The belief that using a particular innovation will lead 
to positive outcomes” 
Casey and Wilson-
Evered, 2012 
Effect Expectancy 
“Degree of ease associated with the use of the system” Venkatesh et al, 2013 
“A user’s subjective evaluations of ease of engaging 
with an IT system” 
Magsamen-Conrad et 
al, 2015 
“A user’s subjective evaluations of ease of engaging 
with an IT system” 
Casey and Wilson-
Evered, 2012 
Social Influence 
“Degree to which an individual perceives that 
important others believe he or she should use the new 
system” 
Venkatesh et al, 2013 
“The extent to which individuals’s perceptions that the 
people who are close to them or those who hold 
important positions in their life believe that they should 
try using the new system” 
Magsamen-Conrad et 
al, 2015 
“Degree to which an individual perceives that it is 
important for others to believe that he or she uses the 
new technology or complies with other’s expectations’ 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
Facilitating 
Conditions 
“Degree to which an individual believes that an 
organizational and technical infrastructure exists to 
support use of the system” 
Venkatesh et al, 2013 
“The extent to which individuals consider that there are 
certain technical and organizational conditions existing 
that help facilitate the use of the system” 
Magsamen-Conrad et 
al, 2015 
“The level of accessibility to technological and 
organizational resources that facilitate the use of the IT 
system” 
Casey and Wilson-
Evered, 2012 
 
Performance Expectancy 
Performance expectancy is explained as the extent to which the user considers the 
technology to be a valuable asset to the performance in daily tasks. According to 
Venkatesh et al (2003), performance expectancy is the major construct that can help 
foresee further technology adoption. The construct was originally defined as perceived 
usefulness in the TAM model. Furthermore, Motivation Model describes the 
predecessor of performance expectancy construct as extrinsic motivation; Innovation 
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Diffusion Theory defines performance expectancy root construct as relative advantage, 
and finally, Social Cognitive Theory includes one of the predecessors of performance 
expectancy in construct outcome expectation (Magsamen-Conrad et al, 2015). Multiple 
studies done using the UTAUT model show a significant relationship between 
performance expectancy and behavioral intentions to adopt various technologies 
(Oliveira et al, 2014, Magsamen-Conrad et al, 2015, Casey and Wilson-Evered, 2012).  
Effort Expectancy 
Effort expectancy is a metric that is describing how easy it is for the user to operate the 
software. Research by Taiwo and Downe (2013) claims that show that the construct 
does not show much significance in explaining behavioral intentions (as cited in 
Magsamen-Conrad et al, 2015). However, a study by Diño and de Guzman (2015) 
showed that when dealing with the older group of adults effort expectancy was 
important for investigating the intentions of adopting a certain technology (as cited in 
Magsamen-Conrad et al, 2015). Effort expectancy is described as a significant construct 
of UTAUT in case of compulsory and voluntary technology usage. However, it is noted 
that during the initial usage of the technology the factor is more important, but after 
some time it loses its significance in explaining technology practice. Moreover, it was 
suggested that effort expectancy factor is more significant among women rather than 
men, and for older working individuals (Venkatesh et al, 2003).  
Social Influence 
Social Influence is the construct defined by the importance of social opinion whether 
the individual should use the technology. There are several root constructs that were the 
predecessors of social influence: subjective norm, social factors, and image. Magsamen-
Conrad et al (2015) claim that the construct does not show significance in explaining 
behavioral intentions. The variable includes the perception of the public image 
improvement when the technology is adopted, as well as the opinions of the closest 
people on whether the individual should be using the software. Social influence also 
includes the perception of being penalized in case the behavior does not meet the 
desired norms. However, prior literature highlights that social influence is important in 
the context of compulsory usage of technology at the early stages. 
  32 
Facilitating Conditions 
Facilitating conditions factor is described as “degree to which an individual believes 
that an organizational and technical infrastructure exists to support use of the system” 
(Ventakesh et al, 2003). Facilitating conditions construct derives from perceived 
behavioral control, compatibility, and facilitating conditions of Model of Personal 
Computer Utilization. The variable is a combination of the perceptions regarding the 
available facilities and technological resources that could help in using the software. 
Furthermore, assistance from a professional and provided support are considered as a 
part of facilitating conditions. Moreover, the technology should match the experience, 
necessities, and ethics of the individual. 
Application of UTAUT in Research 
The model, as stated by Ventakesh et al (2003), is not sufficient as the source of 
information for the software designer when analyzing the individual acceptance of 
technology. The article suggests that the UTAUT model should be used in combination 
with various different models to achieve a more accurate result. Moreover, it would be 
beneficial to have the model tested against different demographic groups, on different 
technologies, and in different contexts.  
 
UTAUT model has been used in multiple studies regarding the adoption of new 
technology. Ting and Deng (2012) used the UTAUT model to determine the main 
factors that influence the decision of the individuals on whether to adopt the use of 
mobile e-books. The study suggested to include an additional variable – perceived cost. 
This was done due to the fact that mobile books are paid by the user, and this might 
affect the adoption due to the financial condition of the individual. Moreover, it was 
suggested that there should be a path added within UTAUT, that describes the influence 
of effort expectancy on performance expectancy (see Figure 2). The study also 
suggested to include a path from Social Influence construct to Performance Expectancy. 
It was believed that these two variables have a dependency on each other. 
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The outcome of the research showed that performance expectancy has quite an 
important impact on the behavioral intention. Furthermore, effort expectancy has both 
direct and indirect impact on behavioral intentions. Finally, the facilitating conditions 
and perceived costs showed no influence on the adoption of the mobile e-books. 
However, social influence was proven to have a positive impact on performance 
expectancy. Therefore, the adjustments made to the UTAUT in the study were proven to 
be important for a wider picture of adoption of mobile e-books.  
 
Another study with the use of an enhanced UTAUT model was done for analyzing the 
adoption of mHealth adoption among the elderly population of Bangladesh (Hoque and 
Sorwar, 2017).  
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Figure 2. Modified UTAUT Model. Source: Ting and Deng (2012) 
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Figure 3 demonstrates the updated model.  
 
Figure 3. Modified UTAUT Model. Source: Hoque and Sorwar (2017) 
There are additional constructs added: technology anxiety and resistance to change. 
Moreover, a new path was suggested to analyze the impact of facilitating conditions on 
the behavioral intention in addition to the user behavior. The results of the empirical test 
showed that performance expectancy, effort expectancy, and social influence have a 
positive effect on behavioural intentions. Moreover, the hypotheses related to 
technology anxiety and resistance to change were confirmed, these two factors 
negatively impact the behavioral intentions to adopt mHealth. The study was limited to 
a certain population category; hence it would not be possible to understand the factors 
affecting the adoption of mHealth globally. The constructs technology anxiety and 
resistance to change are characteristic to an elderly population. However, the study 
proves that it is possible to use the model for studies related to mHealth technology 
adoption.  
2.7.2 Task Technology Fit Model 
Task Technology Fit (TTF) is a model derived from the Technology Acceptance Model 
(Davis, 1989). TAM facilitated the research related to the use of technology. It helps to 
predict the adoption behavior related to technology. The model is based on two 
constructs: perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use (Daradkeh, 2019). Perceived 
Usefulness is described as a subjective perception of the user towards the usefulness of 
the technology for everyday tasks. Perceived Ease of Use is defined as the expectation 
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of the user regarding the effort necessary to operate the technology (Daradkeh, 2019). 
TTF is expanding the TAM model. TTF or Tack Technology fit adoption model 
proposes that in case the technology allows to complete the daily operations in an 
efficient manner, a user will consider adoption of such technology. This suggests that 
the adoption of a particular technology depends greatly on the tasks the user carries out 
on a daily basis (Goodhue and Thompson, 1995).  
 
There are three categories of tasks defined by Gebauer et al (2010): operational, 
leadership, and informational and knowledge tasks. The model uses four components in 
order to illustrate the acceptance of the new technology: task characteristics, task 
technology fit, technology characteristic, and use. Figure 4 presents the TTF model and 
the relationships between constructs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The characteristics of the technology and the tasks help determine the task technology 
fit, which leads to the decision whether to use or not to use the technology to execute 
daily operations. Another definition, suggested by Daradkeh et al (2019) is describing 
tasks as activities, that people engage in on a daily basis for business purposes, such as 
decision-making and analysis, for which they use technology as a tool. TTF is 
showcasing the relationship between the task requirements, user capabilities and the 
functionality of the technology, and how the aforementioned qualities influence the 
adoption of the certain technology for performing the tasks. The model presented by 
Goodhue and Thompson (1995) is suited for the individuals. Zigurs and Buckland 
(1998) adapted the model to fit the groups. Daradkeh et al (2019) mention that there are 
Task 
Characteristics 
Technology 
Characteristics 
Task Technology Fit Use of Technology 
Figure 4. Task Technology Fit model. Source: Goodhue and Thompson, 1995 
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multiple variations of the TTF model used nowadays. The study done by Daradkeh et al 
(2019) was done on the adoption of visual analytics tool using a combination of TAM 
and TTF. The findings of the study showed that the higher the ease of use and the 
usefulness were, the higher the value of TTF was reported. Task Technology Fit model 
was also used to study the adoption of cloud-based collaborative learning technologies 
(Yadegaridehkordi et al, 2014). Figure 5 demonstrates the model used in the research by 
Yadegaridehkordi et al (2014). The study was conducted among the undergraduate 
students in Universiti Teknologi Malaysia which is a similar target group as in the 
current study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task Characteristics were divided into the following sub-variables: task non-routineness 
and task interdependence. Technology Characteristics consist of personalization, 
collaboration, and mobility constructs. The analysis was done with the help of the 
SmartPLS tool. The results proved that task interdependence showed no statistical 
significance in explaining task-technology fit. However, the remaining sub-constructs 
were proven to be positively influencing task technology fit, and subsequent adoption of 
cloud-based collaborative learning technologies among undergraduate students of the 
Malaysian University of Technology. 
  
Task 
Characteristics: 
- Non-routineness 
- Interdependence 
Technology 
Characteristics 
- Personalization 
- Collaboration 
- Mobility 
Task Technology Fit Use of Technology 
Figure 5. Task Technology Fit model (Yadegaridehkordi et al, 2014) 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Integration of UTAUT and TTF  
Several successful attempts have been made to combine TTF and UTAUT models to 
study technology adoption from a wider perspective. Zobayer (2017) used the TTF-
UTAUT model to analyze the adoption of mobile banking among people in Bangladesh. 
With the help of the integrated model, it was possible to analyze the relationship 
between the constructs of two models. Task-Technology Fit was expected to positively 
influence the performance expectancy regarding mobile banking. However, the model 
did not include behavioral intentions as a separate construct, which could be a valuable 
asset to the model. SPSS was used for the analysis of the collected data sample.  The 
study showed that technology characteristics have a stronger impact on task technology 
fit than task characteristics. Task technology fit was proven to have a positive influence 
on the performance expectancy, which proved the correlations between UTAUT and 
TTF models.  
 
Another attempt to analyze the adoption of technology with the use of UTAUT and TTF 
was done by Bozorgkhou (2014). The study analyses the adoption of internet shopping 
among users in Iran. In this research, the data set was analyzed against two models. The 
results showed no significance in explaining performance expectancy with the task 
technology fit constrict. Effort expectation did not show significance in explaining user 
adoption. Nonetheless, most of the hypotheses defined in the study were confirmed. 
Social impacts, performance expectancy and facilitating conditions showed a positive 
influence on the adoption of internet shopping. 
 
The combination of UTAUT and TTF models was used for the investigation of the 
password manager adoption among students of European universities. With the help of 
the models, it is expected to discover the factors that may lead to the intentions of 
students to use password managers, as well as to determine the factors that positively 
affect the adoption of password managers.  
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3.2 Research Model  
Password management is necessary nowadays due to the increasing amount of accounts 
and passwords people are required to use, and the security requirements for those 
passwords in order not to lose any sensitive data. Password managers provide the users 
with a way to store the credentials without the need to memorize them. People have to 
log into systems at work, at the university and for personal purposes, such as banking, 
social media, and messenger. However, not all of the users decide to adopt password 
managers for their daily operations, moreover, some people have never heard of 
password managers before. The study is aiming at answering the following research 
questions: 
1. What is a demographic profile of a European student who (does not) use a 
password manager? 
2. What factors affect password manager adoption among the European students?  
The research model used for this thesis is a combination of UTAUT and TTF. Figure 6 
presents the constructs and the relationships between them that will be analyzed in the 
context of password manager adoption among students in Europe.  
 
 
Figure 6. Study model and construct codes. UTAUT and TTF 
 
The use of password managers has not yet been analyzed using such a framework. The 
study is based on multiple research papers discussing the adoption of different 
Task 
Characteristics 
(TaskC) 
Technology 
Characteristics 
(TC) 
Task 
Technology 
Fit (TTF) 
Performance 
Expectancy 
(PE) 
Effort 
Expectancy 
(EE) 
Social 
Influence (SI) 
Facilitating 
Conditions 
(FC) 
Behavioural 
Intentions 
(BI) 
Adoption 
(Adopt) 
  39 
technologies among different demographic categories. The TTF model tackles the task 
and technology characteristics and determines the task technology fit of a certain 
technology. UTAUT allows us to highlight the general attitudes towards the use of 
technology, such as effort expectancy, performance expectancy, and social influence. 
The same models were adapted for this thesis research: in order to identify the factors 
that affect the adoption of password managers. A decision was made to use the 
enhancement of UTAUT model done by Hoque and Sorwar (2017), and to study the 
relationship between facilitating conditions and behavioral intentions, as well as the 
adoption of password managers. However, the constructs of technology anxiety and 
resistance to change are specific to the elderly population, and since the study is 
targeting students, those two constructs were eliminated from the model. Moreover, the 
influence of effort expectancy and social influence on the performance expectancy were 
studied. This modification of UTAUT was suggested by the study of Ting and Deng 
(2012) in the context of mobile e-books adoption. This construct, however, is not actual 
for the studies on password managers since most of the provided vaults are free to 
install. The correlation between the TTF and UTAUT model have been previously 
studied in the context of mobile banking adoption (Oliveira et al, 2014), where it was 
proven that task technology fit construct is significant in explaining performance 
expectancy. Moreover, Bozorgkhou (2014) mentioned the effect of task technology fit 
on performance expectancy in the study on internet shopping among the users in Iran. 
Thus, the relationship was included in the research to find out whether it is significant in 
the context of password manager adoption.  
3.3 Hypotheses 
TTF was used in order to find out how the technology fits the daily tasks the users need 
to execute, and whether the technical characteristics are suitable for the further adoption 
and use. Fagan et al (2017) mention that convenience is a major factor affecting the 
willingness of the people to adopt password managers. As per the TTF model and the 
previous research on mBanking adoption by Zobayer (2017), as well as the study of 
Oliveira et al (2014) and Fagan et al (2017) the following hypotheses are formed: 
 
H1. Technology characteristics have a positive effect on task technology fit in the 
context of password manager adoption 
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H2. Task characteristics have positive effects on task technology fit in the context of 
password manager adoption 
H3. Task Technology Fit has a positive effect on performance expectancy in the context 
of password manager adoption 
H4. Task Technology Fit has a positive impact on the adoption of password managers 
 
UTAUT model is used to tackle the intentions of whether to use a certain technology. 
The model consists of four concepts that describe the user’s intentions and behavior: 
effort expectancy, social influence, performance expectancy and facilitating conditions. 
The previous study of Maclean and Ophoff (2019) used the model for analyzing the 
password manager adoption among employed people. Performance expectancy 
identifies whether a user expects the improvement in performing his daily tasks by 
adopting certain technology. It is one of the most important factors for the user to 
decide whether to use the technology. The following hypothesis is being checked in 
relation to performance expectancy: 
H5. Performance expectancy positively affects the behavioral intention to adopt 
password managers 
Based on the previous research by Maclean and Ophoff (2019) as well as the study by 
Hoque and Sorwar (2017), and Ting and Deng (2012), the following hypotheses are 
checked against the target group of the thesis: 
H6. Effort expectancy positively influences the behavioral intentions of an individual to 
adopt password managers 
H7. Effort expectancy positively influences the performance expectancy of an 
individual regarding the password managers 
H8. Social influence positively affects the performance expectancy of an individual 
regarding password managers 
H9. Social influence positively affects the intention of an individual to use password 
managers 
H10. Facilitating conditions have a positive effect on the intention of a user to adopt the 
software. 
H11. Facilitating conditions have a positive effect on the decision of a user to adopt the 
software. 
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Further, the four main constructs of UTAUT as per the hypotheses may result in the 
behavioral intentions to use password managers, which further may positively affect the 
adoption of the password management software. Hence, the final hypothesis based on 
the UTAUT model is the following: 
 
H12.  Behavioral intentions to use password managers positively affect the further 
adoption of the aforementioned technology. 
3.4 Measures 
The variables in UTAUT and TTF models cannot be measured directly, thus each of the 
constructs will be analyzed through several items (Hair et al, 2017). Effort Expectancy 
in the context of the study is defined as the ease of use of password managers (Maclean 
and Ophoff, 2019), and it was represented by four different items. Performance 
Expectancy is defined as a level of confidence of the user that the password managers 
will be beneficial in performing the daily tasks. The construct was presented by 5 items. 
Social influence defines whether the opinion of family and friends of the respondent 
influences the adoption of password managers. The construct was presented by 7 
different items. Facilitating conditions is the perception of the respondents whether the 
provided infrastructure provides enough opportunities to use password managers. Three 
items were used to measure the construct. Task characteristics were measured by 7 
different items. The construct defines whether the respondent perceives the technology 
as appropriate for completing the daily tasks successfully. Technology characteristics 
showcase the perception of the user towards the benefits of the technological functions 
of the password managers. Finally, behavioral intentions were presented by 5 
measurement items, and the construct was determining whether the respondent would 
like to adopt password managers. The Likert scale was used for measuring each of the 
items, from 1 to 5, where 1 was defined as ‘Strongly disagree’, and 5 was defined as 
‘Strongly agree’. Table 5 shows the constructs used in the study and their definitions in 
the context of password managers. 
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Table 5. Thesis model constructs and definitions 
 
Name of Variable 
Number 
of items 
Definition Based on 
Effort Expectancy 4 
The degree to which the user considers password 
managers to be convenient for regular use 
Goodhue 
and 
Thompson, 
1995; 
Venkatesh 
et al, 2013; 
Oliveira et 
al, 2014; 
 
 
Performance Expectancy 5 
The perception of the individual that password 
managers will be useful for performing regular 
tasks 
Facilitating Conditions 3 
The perception whether there is necessary 
technology and organization facilities available 
for the adoption of password managers 
Social Influence 7 
The extent to which the user feels that the close 
circle of people believe it is important to use 
password managers 
Technology 
Characteristics 
4 
The perception of whether the functionality of 
password managers makes it suitable for 
performing daily tasks related to password 
management 
Task Characteristics 7 
The extent to which a password manager is 
necessary to perform daily tasks 
Task Technology Fit 4 
The perception of whether a password manager is 
suitable and useful for performing daily tasks 
Behavioral Intentions 5 
The extent to which a respondent intends to use 
the password manager in the future 
Adoption 4 
The degree to which the respondent uses a 
password manager 
3.5 Data Collection Process 
The data was collected by using a popular tool for surveys Webropol, the access to 
which was provided by the University of Turku. The link to the questionnaire was 
distributed via social media, such as Facebook acquaintances, Facebook SurveyCircle 
group and ESN groups, acquaintance by contacting personally, and mailing lists of the 
University of Turku, South-Eastern Finland University of Applied Sciences (XAMK), 
Turku University of Applied Sciences, and Åbo Akademi University. There were 
multiple reminders sent throughout the two-month period while the data was being 
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gathered. The primary source of the responses was social media and personal contacts 
among current students. The design of the survey was based on the UTAUT and TTF 
model constructs. The variables could not be measured directly, therefore multiple 
questions were created for each construct. It was necessary to include multiple items per 
each variable due to the large data sample that was intended to be collected (Hair et al, 
2017). At the end of the survey, demographic questions were presented to the 
participants in order to understand whether there are some differences in password vault 
adoption depending on the age, gender, educational background and the experience with 
computers and the amount of accounts used daily. 
 
A total of 1454 respondents visited the link initially; however, out of those 312 
respondents completed the whole survey. Four people decided not to participate in the 
survey and informed about the reasons. One of the participants stated not being a 
student as the motive not to proceed further with the questionnaire. Two stated the lack 
of time as the primary reason for not completing the survey. The last one did not 
provide any reason for not proceeding with the questionnaire. The study was primarily 
conducted in Finland, however, participants from all over Europe were invited to 
participate in the questionnaire, since the aim of the study was to analyze the password 
manager adoption among students of European universities. The participation in the 
questionnaire was voluntary and completely anonymous. The personal information that 
was collected was age, gender, field of study, the current degree level the student was 
obtaining. No contact details or names were collected in the process. As a measurement 
scale, the Likert scale was used, with the grading from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree).  
3.6 Data Analysis 
Two models were used to investigate the factors affecting password manager adoption 
among the respondents are Task Technology Fit and UTAUT. The study started by 
verifying the distribution of the data. Eight items have a high value of kurtosis, and 
skewness for seven items is beyond the recommended values by Hair et al (2017). This 
indicates the non-normal distribution (see Appendix A). However, PLS-SEM model is 
suitable for a set of data with non-normal distribution (Hair et al, 2017). Therefore, 
PLS-SEM model was used as a method to analyze the data collected with the 
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questionnaire. The sample size to be analyzed is 265, therefore meeting the required 
amount, which is calculated as 10 times the number of arrows pointing to the construct 
(Hair et al, 2017). Table 6 presents the results of the analysis of constructs: outer 
loadings, Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite Reliability (CR), as well 
as the t-values of the items. The items in italic were removed due to low loading values 
(Hair et al, 2017). 
 
Table 6.  Items, loadings, Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Alpha and Composite 
Reliability (CR) values. Removed items marked in italic. 
Construct Item Code Loading t AVE CR Alpha 
Technology 
Characteristics 
TC1 0,771 22,561 
0,656 0,884 0,827 
TC2 0,832 28,938 
TC3 0,773 34,421 
TC4 0,860 42,033 
Task Characteristics 
TaskC1 0,756 12,235 
0,734 0,892 0,818 
TaskC2 0,801 15,157 
TaskC3 0,767 16,890 
TaskC4 0,495 5,483 
TaskC5 0,493 5,316 
TaskC6 0,019 0,125 
TaskC7 -0,146 1,251 
Task Technology Fit 
TTF1 0,889 64,267 
0,720 0,911 0,868 
TTF2 0,915 79,344 
TTF3 0,835 33,378 
TTF4 0,744 20,065 
Effort Expectancy 
EE1 0,846 29,442 
0,718 0,911 
 
0,869 
 
 
EE2 0,863 38,585 
EE3 0,899 59,850 
EE4 0,777 25,307 
Social Influence 
SI1 0,821 30,068 
0,724 0,940 0,924 
SI2 0,871 48,166 
SI3 0,898 53,295 
SI4 0,868 54,108 
SI5 0,828 29,310 
SI6 0,810 24,839 
SI7 0,360 5,779 
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Table 6 (Continued).  Items, loadings, Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Alpha and 
Composite Reliability (CR) values. Removed items marked in italic 
Performance Expectancy 
PE1 0,845 42,472 
0,721 0,928 0,903 
PE2 0,873 47,451 
PE3 0,865 42,385 
PE4 0,833 35,778 
PE5 0,827 33,972 
Facilitating Conditions 
FC1 0,895 37,666 
0,848 0,918 0,822 FC2 0,922 53,445 
FC3 0,633 7,596 
Behavioral Intentions 
BI1 0,920 80,690 
0,878 0,967 0,954 
BI2 0,602 10,770 
BI3 0,960 176,284 
BI4 0,926 51,291 
BI5 0,924 49,590 
Adoption 
Adopt1 0,986 305,153 
0,973 0,991 0,986 
Adopt2 0,981 209,950 
Adopt3 0,975 134,088 
Adopt4 0,619 10,808 
 
First, the reliability and the validity of the model were tested. In order to confirm the 
validity of the study, the items with loading below 0.4 were removed (Hair et al, 2017). 
which included SI7, TaskC6 and TaskC7. 
There were some items with the loading between 0.4 and 0.7, but they were not 
negatively affecting the validity and reliability indicators, hence the decision was made 
not to remove them from the model (Hair et al, 2017). Further, the items with the 
loadings between 0.4 and 0.7 were analyzed. As Hair et al (2017) state, it is necessary to 
verify whether discarding the items with the loading below 0.7 affects the validity and 
reliability measures. In case the deletion increases the AVE, Alpha or Composite 
Reliability, it is necessary to remove the item, otherwise, it should be maintained in the 
model. After verifying the dependability of the relationship between the construct 
composites and Alpha, AVE and CR, it was decided to remove TaskC4, TaskC5, FC3, 
BI2 and Adopt4. After removing the items with low loadings, the model reliability and 
validity was analyzed. 
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Composite reliability of all the constructs was above 0.7, which confirms the internal 
consistency. The average variance extracted was quite high for all the constructs, above 
the recommended value of 0.5. Finally, the alpha value is above the recommended 
threshold of 0.770, which means that the study has convergent validity and validity, 
which leads to the conclusion that the constructs are suitable for the model test 
(Oliveira, 2014). Table 7 shows the correlations between constructs and AVE values. 
 
Table 7. Fornell-Larcker criterion. Correlations and AVE values between constructs 
 Adopt BI EE FC PE SI TC TTF TaskC 
Adopt 0,986         
BI 0,602 0,937        
EE 0,306 0,361 0,848       
FC 0,361 0,329 0,523 0,921      
PE 0,425 0,699 0,468 0,335 0,849     
SI 0,367 0,455 0,328 0,218 0,356 0,851    
TC 0,416 0,523 0,464 0,345 0,646 0,364 0,810   
TTF 0,579 0,699 0,482 0,417 0,678 0,454 0,745 0,848  
TaskC 0,101 0,302 0,248 0,214 0,378 0,139 0,445 0,325 0,857 
 
 
The loadings of the remaining items in each construct was higher than the cross-
loadings, and the square root of AVE has a higher value than the correlations between 
the constructs, which confirms the discriminant validity. The reliability and validity, as 
well as the internal consistency of the study, was confirmed. The results of the data 
analysis will be presented in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
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4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Demographic Distribution of the Respondents 
A total of 312 responses were collected with the help of the questionnaire. The primary 
analysis of the questionnaire responses identified four incomplete responses since the 
participants quit the survey. After further screening, three responses were removed due 
to the fact that the respondents were from Mexico, Canada, and China, as they did not 
belong to the target group. Shortly after, two people reported, that they filled in the 
survey despite not being students. The final report for further statistical analysis 
consisted of 303 entries. Despite the fact that some respondents claimed not to know 
about password managers, further, they responded positively to the questions about 
their use of the software, which identifies the inconsistency in some of the responses. 
Therefore, those entries were eliminated. The final data set consisted of 265 valid 
responses. The respondents were from 22 different European countries. The analysis of 
the data was done based on the demographic data reported by the respondents.  Out of 
265 respondents, 62% were women and 37% were men. One percent of respondents 
preferred not to state their gender. The majority of the respondents were aged 21-25 – 
48%.  Some of the survey participants were pursuing a Bachelor’s degree – 44 %; 48% 
were undergoing a Master’s degree and 8% are studying Ph.D.  
Table 8 summarizes the distribution of the answers based on the demographic 
information.  
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Table 8. Demographic distribution of the responses 
Factors  Distribution (N=265) 
Gender 
Female 62% 
Male 37% 
N/a 1% 
Age 
18-20 11% 
21-25 48% 
26-30 28% 
31-35 8% 
Over 35 5% 
Level of Education 
Bachelor's 44% 
Master's 48% 
PhD 8% 
Educational Background 
Law 2% 
Computer Engineering 12% 
Economics 17% 
Education 4% 
Humanities 12% 
Medicine 7% 
Natural Sciences 9% 
Social Sciences 21% 
Other Engineering 4% 
Other 12% 
Number of passwords used 
None 3% 
Less than 5 35% 
Less than 10 46% 
10 to 15 13% 
More than 15 3% 
Computer proficiency level 
Basic 18% 
Intermediate 54% 
Advanced 28% 
 
4.2 Demographic Profile of a Password Manager User and Non-User 
A total of 77% of the respondents claimed to either not know about password managers 
or choosing not to use it. The remaining 23% of the respondents reported the use of 
password managers.  Out of the non-users, 71% were female, 28% male and 1% did not 
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state their gender. Among the password manager users, 31% were female, 67% were 
male and 2% did not state their gender. The majority of password manager users (37%) 
were aged 26-30, while the majority of the non-users of password managers were aged 
21-25 – 53%. The analysis of the educational level shows that most of the students that 
were not using password managers were pursuing their Master’s degree– 47%; 46% 
were pursuing their Bachelor’s degree, and 7% were studying Ph.D. Most of the users 
of password managers were also doing a Master’s degree – 49%, 39% of the users are 
doing their Bachelor’s, and 12% are pursuing their Ph.D. The educational background 
was analyzed as well. Among the students that reported using password managers, the 
majority were studying Computer Engineering - 29%. Most of the respondents that 
were not using password managers study Social Sciences – 25%. Moreover, the survey 
participants were asked the number of accounts with password authentication they need 
to use daily. The biggest part of respondents that use password managers in percentage 
was among the people that have more than 15 passwords in use – 63%. Finally, the 
students were asked to evaluate their computer proficiency level. The majority of 
respondents with basic computer proficiency level stated that they did not use password 
managers – 94%. Among the respondents, with intermediate computer skills, 84% did 
not use password managers, whilst among advanced-skilled computer users, 53% were 
not using the password managers. To sum up, the demographic profile of a password 
manager user among students in Europe is the following: a male of 26-30 years old, 
doing a Master’s degree, studying Computer Engineering and using over 15 passwords 
regularly. The student who does not use password managers is more likely to be a 
female aged 21-25 studying Master’s in Social Sciences and using less than 15 
passwords.  The complete demographic distribution can be found in Appendix A. 
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4.3 Model Testing 
The bootstrapping algorithm was run against the data sample in order to confirm the 
hypotheses with 500 resamples and significance level 5%. Table 9 summarizes the 
hypotheses confirmation and the statistical data: path coefficients, T statistics, p-values 
and R square. 
Table 9.  Results of the hypotheses analysis 
Construct Hypothesis 
Path 
Coefficient 
t 
P 
Values 
R 
Square 
TC > TTF 
TaskC > TTF 
H1 - confirmed 
H2 – not confirmed 
0,748 
-0,008 
22,749 
0,179 
0,000 
0,858 
0,56 
TTF > PE 
EE > PE 
SI > PE 
H3 -confirmed 
H7 - confirmed 
H8 – not confirmed 
0,575 
0,179 
0,037 
11,916 
3,825 
0,824 
0,000 
0,000 
0,410 
0,49 
PE > BI 
EE > BI 
SI > BI 
FC > BI 
H5 – confirmed 
H6 – not confirmed 
H9 - confirmed 
H10 – not confirmed 
0,607 
-0,053 
0,233 
0,103 
12,886 
1,089 
5,189 
1,861 
0,000 
0,277 
0,000 
0,063 
0,55 
FC > Adopt 
TTF > Adopt 
BI > Adopt 
H11 - confirmed 
H4 - confirmed 
H12 - confirmed 
0,128 
0,263 
0,375 
2,582 
4,571 
6,914 
0,010 
0,000 
0,000 
0,42 
 
 
The R2 value shows that the model explains 42% of the variation in the Adopt construct. 
The research outcome also explains 55% of the variance in the behavioral intention 
construct, 49% of Performance Expectancy variation and 56% of Task Technology Fit 
variation. Figure 7 shows the relationships between the constructs in the model and the 
hypotheses; the confirmed hypotheses are marked with an asterisk (*). 
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Figure 7. Construct relationship and results. Confirmed hypotheses marked with asterisk 
(*). 
 
The results show that TC construct is statistically significant in explaining TTF 
(β=0,748, p<0,01), therefore the H1 was confirmed. TaskC construct has no statistical 
significance over TTF (β=-0,008, p>0,10), hence H2 was not confirmed. TTF has 
statistical significance over PE construct (β=0,575, p<0,01), confirming H3. TTF 
construct also has statistical significance in explaining adoption (β=0,263, p<0,01), 
which confirms H4.  The analysis shows that PE has statistical significance in 
explaining BI (β=0,607, p<0,01), thus confirming H5. The study results show that the 
H6 was not confirmed since EE is not statistically significant for behavioral intentions 
(β= -0,053, p<0,10). Moreover, effort expectancy has statistical significance towards 
performance expectancy (β= 0,179, p<0,01), thus confirming H7.  Social influence has 
no statistical significance in explaining performance expectancy (β=0,035, p>0,10), 
hence H8 was not confirmed by the study.  Social influence construct, however, is 
statistically significant in explaining Behavioural Intention (β=0,233, p<0,01), thus 
confirming H9. H10 is not supported by the results of the analysis since facilitating 
conditions construct is not significant in explaining behavioral intentions (β=0,103, 
p>0,10). Furthermore, H11 is confirmed, as facilitating, conditions are statistically 
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R2=0,42 
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β= -0,008 β=0,575* 
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significant in explaining adoption (β=0,128, p<0,05). Behavioral intention is significant 
in explaining adoption (β=0,375, p<0,01). so H12 was confirmed. 
4.4 Indirect Effects 
Table 10 shows the indirect effects of model constructs on Adoption construct.  
 
Table 10. Specific indirect effects and p-values 
Path P Values 
EE -> BI -> Adopt 0,294 
FC -> BI -> Adopt 0,072 
EE -> PE -> BI -> Adopt 0,001 
SI -> PE -> BI -> Adopt 0,412 
TC -> TTF -> PE -> BI -> Adopt 0,000 
PE -> BI -> Adopt 0,000 
TTF -> PE -> BI -> Adopt 0,000 
TaskC -> TTF -> PE -> BI -> Adopt 0,865 
SI -> BI -> Adopt 0,000 
TC -> TTF -> Adopt 0,000 
TaskC -> TTF -> Adopt 0,858 
 
The table shows that Effort Expectancy is significant in explaining Adoption through 
Performance Expectancy and Behavioral Intentions (p<0,01). Social Influence is 
significant in explaining Adoption through Behavioral Intentions (p<0,01).  Technology 
Characteristics are significant in explaining Adoption through the factor TTF, PE, and 
BI (p< 0,01). Task Technology Fit is significant in explaining Adoption with the 
mediating factors PE and BI (p<0,01).  
4.5 Discussion  
The study was aimed at finding out the factors that affect password manager adoption 
among students in Europe. The data sample collected with the help of the survey was 
further analyzed with PLS-SEM method. There were twelve hypotheses formulated for 
the data set, out of which eight were confirmed. The study shows that the proposed 
model is important in understanding the behavioral intentions in the adoption of 
password managers. There are certain theoretical and practical implications of the study. 
The analysis shows that the proposed model explains over 50% of the variation in the 
behavioral intention. Moreover, the study explains around 40% of variation in the 
adoption construct. 
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4.5.1 Demographic profiles of users and non-users 
The research did not only analyze the responses against the theoretical models but also 
studied the demographic distribution of the data sample. The findings show that most of 
the men are aware of password managers and use them, while the majority of students 
that do not use password managers are women. Moreover, the adoption of the password 
vaults was mostly observed among the people of 26-30 years old. Students that pursue a 
career in computer engineering are the majority of the password manager users, while 
the students of social sciences are prevailing among the respondents that had no prior 
knowledge related to the application. The tendency was observed that the majority of 
respondents that claim to have advanced computer skills, use password managers, 
whilst the respondents with basic computer knowledge were not aware of password 
vaults.  Further studies could be focused on investigating the demographic factors as 
mediating in addition to the theoretical models.  
4.5.2 Technology Characteristics and Task Characteristics 
As the outcome of the research, it can be concluded that technology characteristics have 
significant effect on the task technology fit (TTF), whereas task characteristics did not 
show any statistical significance in explaining TTF. Moreover, the indirect relationship 
shows that technology characteristics not only influences task technology fit, but 
subsequently it affects behavioral intentions to use password managers, and eventually 
the adoption (p<0,01). Furthermore, since TTF affects adoption directly, the technology 
characteristics affect adoption through TTF. Meanwhile, task characteristics were not 
proven to be significant in explaining TTF or adoption.  
 
It may be concluded that the users are more likely to use the software if the 
functionality of it seems attractive. Even if the tasks would need a password manager, it 
does not mean that the user is likely to use the software. There are many alternative 
ways to manage passwords, so if an individual does not find the technological 
characteristics appealing, it is highly unlikely that the decision will be made to adopt the 
software. The security and usability limitations of password vaults may seriously affect 
the further adoption of the software. Furthermore, it is possible that some individuals 
were not aware of the useful and important features of password vaults. The study 
shows that in case the students find password managers to be technologically suitable, 
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they are likely to be willing to use the software. However, it is important to present the 
technological advantages of vaults in order to make them attractive. A study conducted 
by Fagan et al (2017) shows similar results: some of the participants of the research 
claim that they do not use password managers due to lack of usability.  
4.5.3 Social Influence 
Social influence showed statistical significance in explaining behavioral intentions in 
the context of password managers. Moreover, Social Influence is significant in 
explaining Adoption indirectly through BI. This means that if the close relatives, friends 
or people from other social circles are using password managers, it is more likely for the 
individual to consider adopting the password vaults. As the study was done regarding 
the students in Europe, it may mean that if the fellow students are using password 
managers, it is more likely for the individual to start using the software as well. This 
leads to the conclusion that word of mouth is an important factor for password vaults to 
become attractive among students. The study conducted by Maclean and Ophoff (2019) 
shows that social influence is not significant in explaining behavioural intentions. 
However, the target group for the research was different. 
4.5.4 Effort Expectancy 
Effort Expectancy is not significant in explaining the adoption of password managers. 
However, indirectly through Performance Expectancy and Behavioural Intentions, 
Effort Expectancy is significant in explaining password manager adoption. It means that 
a student is likely to adopt a password manager if the software seems to be easy to 
install and performs well according to the needs. The findings match the study of 
Maclean and Ophoff (2019), though this thesis research not only analyzed the direct 
effect of effort expectancy over behavioural intentions, but also indirect effect on 
adoption of password managers. 
4.5.5 Facilitating Conditions 
Facilitating conditions were also important in determining the adoption factor. If the 
students consider the facilities provided to them as suitable for using password 
managers, they are more likely to use password managers. The study by Maclean and 
Ophoff (2019) shows that facilitating conditions are not significant in explaining 
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behavioral intentions, which matches this thesis study. However, the relationship 
between facilitating conditions and adoption was proven by this research. 
 
4.5.6 Performance Expectancy 
Performance expectancy was proven to be one of the most important factors in forming 
behavioral intentions towards the adoption of password managers. This finding matches 
the results mentioned by Maclean and Ophoff (2019). If the students in Europe see that 
the software is useful and is capable of effectively completing the required tasks, then 
they are more likely to be in favor of adopting it. Furthermore, the study by Fagan et al 
(2017) proves that respondents avoid adopting password managers if they see lack of 
need and usability drawbacks. However, the participants of the study by Fagan et al 
(2017) who use password managers, reported the convenience and usefulness of the 
software. 
4.6 Practical Implications  
Based on the study, if a company providing password managers should focus on 
ensuring that the services are convenient, secure and user-friendly. The emphasis should 
be done on providing potential users with the necessary knowledge on the usefulness of 
password managers, as well as the technological benefits of the software. This may be 
achieved through marketing campaigns, for example. Moreover, social influence should 
not be underestimated. It is important to understand that the close family and friends’ 
opinion have a serious impact on the intentions of the individuals to use password 
managers in the future.  
 
The study may be used to create trainings targeting the factors that may lead to 
password managers adoption among students. This way the students could develop 
secure practices in terms of managing their credentials, which could be beneficial for 
their own security, as well as the security of the companies that are further employing 
the graduates. The model used in the study was proven to be suitable for studies related 
to password manager adoption. 
 
The study included collecting demographic information, which was not eventually 
studied in-depth. The next step of the research would be to analyze whether gender, age, 
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or educational background has an influence on the decision whether to adopt the 
software. Moreover, the online experience, as well as the experience with using the 
Internet may be a mediating factor in the model. The future research could focus on 
investigating the correlation between the demographic information and the adoption 
among the individuals towards password managers. Moreover, the study did not include 
the data collected through the open question regarding the reasons for the individuals 
that led to them not adopting password managers.  
4.7 Future Directions 
In order to confirm the factors affecting the adoption of password managers, a future 
suggestion would be to study the adoption of the password managers in-depth, by first 
presenting the software including a more detailed information on the functionality and 
the benefits of it, and later collecting the responses from the same group of people after 
they get familiarized with the product. This way it could be possible to verify whether 
the behavioral intentions lead to the adoption of the software within the same group of 
respondents.  
 
The demographic review points to the assumption that there is a correlation between the 
number of accounts used daily and the adoption of the password managers. 
Furthermore, there is a possibility that the educational background and the level of 
education influence the decision on whether to adopt the use of password vaults. For 
example, the majority of the current users of password managers study computer 
science, while most of the respondents who reported not being knowledgeable about the 
software study social sciences. There is a possibility that there is a correlation, hence it 
would be beneficial to verify whether the demographic factors could be mediating in 
forming the behavioral intention to adopt the software, or these factors could lead 
directly to adoption of password vaults. This may help understand which groups of 
students should be targeted in terms of security trainings and additional studies on 
security practices. A separate study may be conducted in the future among the students 
with a non-technical background in order to confirm which factors to focus on in order 
to encourage the adoption of password manager. Furthermore, an emphasis may be 
done on how students from different countries react towards the software, which could 
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help in creation targeted trainings tailored to the specifics of the background of the 
users.  
 
With the increasing amount of services available online, it is very important not to 
underestimate the impact of poor password management on the security of sensitive 
data. If credentials are stolen or hacked, the attacker may gain access to banking details, 
healthcare information, personal details shared on social media, or even corporate data, 
if the job-related accounts are compromised. The study was conducted among students 
since it is important to understand how to enforce best practices related to online 
security among the people that will later be employed and will have to deal not only 
with their personal data but also the data related to their workplace, which may be 
highly confidential. There are, however, some limitations in this study, since it was not 
possible to profoundly examine the responses in relation to the demographical 
background. However, this can be a subject for further study. Moreover, the research 
confirms that the combination of TTF and UTAUT could serve for the statistical 
analysis related to the adoption of password managers.  
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5 Conclusion 
Passwords are a common way of authentication for different types of accounts. People 
use passwords to log in to their online bank, healthcare systems, study, and work-related 
portals. Since the capacity of human memory is limited, many people reuse the same 
passwords for different websites, or they create simple passwords to remember them 
easily. This causes a serious security risk. If a hacker is able to steal a password, all the 
sensitive information will be stolen. Password managers were created to facilitate 
secure password management; however, many people decide not to use the software for 
managing their credentials. The study is aiming at finding out what are the factors 
affecting password manager adoption among students in Europe. The research questions 
were the following: 
 
1. What is a demographic profile of a European student who (does not) use a 
password manager? 
2. What factors affect password manager adoption among the European students?  
 
This research was conducted in order to answer the aforementioned questions with the 
help of UTAUT and TTF models. These models have been successfully used in other 
studies related to the adoption of various technologies among different demographic 
groups of people. The variations of UTAUT and TTF models were brought together for 
the customized model that was further used as the framework for this thesis.  
 
The study was conducted with the use of a survey that consisted of questions that 
presented the items that formed various variables taken from UTAUT and TTF models. 
The data sample consisted of 265 valid responses. Smart-PLS tool was used for the 
statistical analysis, as it was suitable for non-normal data distribution.  
 
It was found that a person who is a male of 26 – 30 years old, studying Master’s in 
computer engineering is more likely to use password manager. On the other hand, a 
female of 21-25 years old, doing a Master’s in Social Sciences fits the profile of a non-
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user. This can help target the training to raise awareness about a secure way of 
managing passwords.  
 
The outcomes of the study show that the main factors affecting behavioural intentions 
among students in Europe are performance expectancy and social influence. 
Furthermore, task technology fit, behavioural intentions and facilitating conditions 
affect adoption directly, whereas performance expectancy, effort expectancy, 
technology characteristics and social influence affect adoption indirectly. The 
respondents are more likely to use password managers if it suits their needs for 
regularly performed tasks. Moreover, a positive feedback from close social circles may 
affect password manager adoption among European students. The perceived effort and 
the suitable facilities were also proven to be important factors leading to the adoption of 
password managers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  60 
 
 
References 
Arias-Cabarcos, P., Marin, A., Palacios, D., Almenarez, F., & Diaz-Sanchez, D. (2016). 
Comparing Password Management Software: Toward Usable and Secure Enterprise 
Authentication. IT Professional, 18(5), 34-40. doi: 10.1109/mitp.2016.81 
 
Aurigemma, S., Mattson, T., & Leonard, L. (2017). So Much Promise, So Little Use: What is 
Stopping Home End-Users from Using Password Manager Applications?. Proceedings Of The 
50Th Hawaii International Conference On System Sciences (2017). doi: 
10.24251/hicss.2017.490 
 
Bojan, V. (2017). Security Evaluation of Password Manager Browser Extensions (Graduate). 
Aalto University. 
 
Bozorgkhou, N. (2015). An internet shopping user adoption model using an integrated TTF and 
UTAUT: Evidence from Iranian consumers. Management Science Letters, 5(2), 199-204. doi: 
10.5267/j.msl.2014.12.017 
 
Boukayoua, F., De Decker, B., & Naessens, V. (2014). A keyboard that manages your 
passwords in Android. 2014 International Conference On Privacy And Security In Mobile 
Systems (PRISMS). doi: 10.1109/prisms.2014.6970592 
 
Brostoff, S., & Sasse, M. (2000). Are Passfaces More Usable Than Passwords? A Field Trial 
Investigation. People And Computers XIV — Usability Or Else!, 405-424. doi: 10.1007/978-1-
4471-0515-2_27 
 
Casey, T., & Wilson-Evered, E. (2012). Predicting uptake of technology innovations in online 
family dispute resolution services: An application and extension of the UTAUT. Computers In 
Human Behavior, 28(6), 2034-2045. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2012.05.022 
 
Charoen, D., Raman, M., & Olfman, L. (2007). Improving End User Behaviour in Password 
Utilization: An Action Research Initiative. Systemic Practice And Action Research, 21(1), 55-
72. doi: 10.1007/s11213-007-9082-4 
 
Chiasson, S., & Oorschot, P. (2006). A Usability Study and Critique of Two Password 
Managers. Carleton University. 
 
Chinchor, N., Cook, K., & Scholtz, J. (2012). Building Adoption of Visual Analytics Software. 
In Expanding the Frontiers of Visual Analytics and Visualization. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-
4471-2804-5_29 
 
Daradkeh, M. (2019). Visual Analytics Adoption in Business Enterprises. International Journal 
Of Information Systems In The Service Sector, 11(1), 68-89. doi: 10.4018/ijisss.2019010105 
 
Davis, F. (1989). Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Ease of Use, and User Acceptance of 
Information Technology. MIS Quarterly, 13(3), 319. doi: 10.2307/249008 
 
  61 
Egelman, S., Harbach, M., & Peer, E. (2016). Behavior Ever Follows Intention?. Proceedings 
Of The 2016 CHI Conference On Human Factors In Computing Systems - CHI '16. doi: 
10.1145/2858036.2858265 
 
Englert, B., & Shah, P. (2009). On the design and implementation of a secure online password 
vault. Proceedings Of The 2009 International Conference On Hybrid Information Technology - 
ICHIT '09. doi: 10.1145/1644993.1645063 
 
Fagan, M., Albayram, Y., Khan, M., & Buck, R. (2017). An investigation into users’ 
considerations towards using password managers. Human-Centric Computing And Information 
Sciences, 7(1). doi: 10.1186/s13673-017-0093-6 
 
Ferratt, T. W., & Vlahos, G. E. (1998). An investigation of task-technology fit for managers in 
Greece and the US. European Journal of Information Systems. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ejis.3000288 
 
Fukumitsu, M., Hasegawa, S., Iwazaki, J., Sakai, M., & Takahashi, D. (2016). A Proposal of a 
Password Manager Satisfying Security and Usability by Using the Secret Sharing and a 
Personal Server. 2016 IEEE 30Th International Conference On Advanced Information 
Networking And Applications (AINA). doi: 10.1109/aina.2016.45 
 
Gebauer, J., Shaw, M., & Gribbins, M. (2010). Task-Technology Fit for Mobile Information 
Systems. Journal Of Information Technology, 25(3), 259-272. doi: 10.1057/jit.2010.10 
 
Golrang, M. (2013). CredProxy: A Password Manager for Online Authentication 
Environments(Graduate). University of Ottawa. 
 
Goodhue, D., & Thompson, R. (1995). Task-Technology Fit and Individual Performance. MIS 
Quarterly, 19(2), 213. doi: 10.2307/249689 
 
Hair, J., Hult, G., Ringle, C., & Sarstedt, M. (2017). A primer on partial least squares structural 
equation modeling (PLS-SEM). Los Angeles: SAGE. 
 
Hoque, R., & Sorwar, G. (2017). Understanding factors influencing the adoption of mHealth by 
the elderly: An extension of the UTAUT model. International Journal Of Medical 
Informatics, 101, 75-84. doi: 10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2017.02.002 
 
Karole, A., Saxena, N., & Christin, N. (2011). A Comparative Usability Evaluation of 
Traditional Password Managers. Information Security And Cryptology - ICISC 2010, 233-251. 
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_16 
 
Li, H., & Evans, D. (2017). Horcrux: A Password Manager for Paranoids. University of 
Virginia. 
 
Maclean, R., & Ophoff, J. (2019). Determining key factors that lead to the adoption of password 
managers. 2018 International Conference on Intelligent and Innovative Computing 
Applications, ICONIC 2018. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICONIC.2018.8601223 
 
McCarney, D., Barrera, D., Clark, J., Chiasson, S., & van Oorschot, P. (2012). Tapas: design, 
implementation, and usability evaluation of a password manager. Proceedings Of The 28Th 
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference On - ACSAC '12. doi: 
10.1145/2420950.2420964 
 
  62 
Magsamen-Conrad, K., Upadhyaya, S., Joa, C., & Dowd, J. (2015). Bridging the divide: Using 
UTAUT to predict multigenerational tablet adoption practices. Computers In Human 
Behavior, 50, 186-196. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2015.03.032 
 
Miller, G. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity 
for processing information. Psychological Review, 63(2), 81-97. doi: 10.1037/h0043158 
 
Negahban, A., & Chung, C. (2014). Discovering determinants of users perception of mobile 
device functionality fit. Computers In Human Behavior, 35, 75-84. doi: 
10.1016/j.chb.2014.02.020 
 
Nightingale, A. (2009). A guide to systematic literature reviews. Surgery (Oxford), 27(9), 381-
384. doi: 10.1016/j.mpsur.2009.07.005 
 
Oliveira, T., Faria, M., Thomas, M., & Popovič, A. (2014). Extending the understanding of 
mobile banking adoption: When UTAUT meets TTF and ITM. International Journal Of 
Information Management, 34(5), 689-703. doi: 10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2014.06.004 
 
Schougaard, D., Dragoni, N., & Spognardi, A. (2016). Evaluation of Professional Cloud 
Password Management Tools. Current Trends In Web Engineering, 16-28. doi: 10.1007/978-3-
319-46963-8_2 
 
Stobert, E., & Biddle, R. (2014). A Password Manager that Doesn't Remember 
Passwords. Proceedings Of The 2014 Workshop On New Security Paradigms Workshop - 
NSPW '14. doi: 10.1145/2683467.2683471 
 
Tannen, R., Jackson, K., & Temple, J. (2019). Evaluating and Improving the User Interface for 
Password Management Software – A Case Study. Camegie Mellon University. 
 
Ting, G., & Deng, Y. (2012). A study on users' acceptance behavior to mobile e-books 
application based on UTAUT model. 2012 IEEE International Conference On Computer 
Science And Automation Engineering. doi: 10.1109/icsess.2012.6269483 
 
Venkatesh, V., Morris, M., Davis, G., & Davis, F. (2003). User Acceptance of Information 
Technology: Toward a Unified View. MIS Quarterly, 27(3), 425. doi: 10.2307/30036540 
 
Yang, B., Chu, H., Li, G., Petrovic, S., & Busch, C. (2014). Cloud Password Manager Using 
Privacy-Preserved Biometrics. 2014 IEEE International Conference On Cloud Engineering. 
doi: 10.1109/ic2e.2014.91 
 
Yadegaridehkordi, E., Iahad, N., & Ahmad, N. (2014). Task-technology fit and user adoption of 
cloud-based collaborative learning technologies. 2014 International Conference On Computer 
And Information Sciences (ICCOINS). doi: 10.1109/iccoins.2014.6868439 
 
Zhou, T., Lu, Y., & Wang, B. (2010). Integrating TTF and UTAUT to explain mobile banking 
user adoption. Computers in Human Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2010.01.013 
 
Zigurs, I., & Buckland, B. (1998). A Theory of Task/Technology Fit and Group Support 
Systems Effectiveness. MIS Quarterly, 22(3), 313. doi: 10.2307/249668 
 
Zobayer, A., Kader, A., Ur Rashid, M., & Nurunnabi, M. (2019). User perception of mobile 
banking adoption: an integrated TTF-UTAUT model. Journal Of Internet Banking And 
Commerce, 22(3), 1-19. 
  63 
 Appendix A.  
Table I. Demographic distribution: password manager users and non-users 
(frequency) 
 
Distribution Users Non-users 
Gender 
Female 19 144 
Male 41 57 
N/a 1 3 
Age 
18-20 5 24 
21-25 20 108 
26-30 23 51 
31-35 6 14 
Over 35 7 7 
Education level  
Bachelor's 24 93 
Master's 30 97 
PhD 7 14 
Educational background 
Law 1 5 
Computer 
Engineering 
18 13 
Economics 6 38 
Education 2 9 
Humanities 5 27 
Medicine 9 10 
Natural Sciences 9 15 
Social Sciences 6 50 
Other Engineering 1 10 
Other 4 27 
Amount of passwords used 
None 1 8 
Less than 5 10 82 
Less than 10 30 91 
10 to 15 15 20 
More than 15 5 3 
Computer proficiency level 
Basic 3 45 
Intermediate 23 119 
Advanced 35 40 
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Table II. Items used for the research 
 
Item Code Item Description Source 
TaskC1 
I need to manage my 
passwords anytime anywhere 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
TaskC2 
I need to operate my accounts 
anytime anywhere 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
TaskC3 
I need to access my accounts 
several times a day 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
TaskC4 
I use different passwords for 
different accounts 
Self-generated 
TaskC5 
I use strong passwords 
(containing alphabets, numbers 
and characters) for my 
accounts 
Self-generated 
TaskC6 
I need to remember passwords 
for my accounts 
Self-generated 
TaskC7 
I need to write down 
passwords somewhere safe 
Self-generated 
TC1 
With password management 
software I can access my 
accounts anytime anywhere 
Self-generated 
TC2 
Password management 
software provides a real-time 
service 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
TC3 
Password management 
software provides secure 
services 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
TC4 
Password management 
software provides a quick 
service 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
TTF1 
Password management 
software is appropriate for 
managing my passwords 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
TTF2 
In general, password 
management software meets 
my password management 
needs 
Self-generated 
TTF3 
In general, password 
management software is 
enough for password 
management 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
TTF4 
Using password management 
software does not fit with my 
practice preferences 
Self-generated, reverse-
coded 
EE1 
Learning to use password 
management software is/will 
be easy 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
EE2 
It is/will be easy to enter in the 
password management 
software interface 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
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Table II (Continued). Items used for the research 
 
EE3 
It is/will be easy to use the 
password management 
software skillfully 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
EE4 
I do not/will not have any 
doubts about what I am doing 
when I am using the service 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
SI1 
The people that influence 
me value the use of password 
management software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
SI2 
The people that influence me 
use password management 
software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
SI3 
Those people that influence 
my behavior think I should use 
password management 
software 
Venkatesh et al, 2003 
SI4 
Those people that are 
important to me think that I 
should use password 
management software 
Venkatesh et al, 2003 
SI5 
The people that influence me 
help me learning about 
password management 
software 
Self-generated 
SI6 
The people that influence me 
introduce me to password 
management software 
Self-generated 
SI7 
At my school/university I have 
been introduced to use of 
password management 
software 
Self-generated 
PE1 
I feel password management 
software is/will be useful 
Self-generated 
PE2 
Password management 
software brings/will bring 
convenience to password 
management 
Self-generated 
PE3 
Password management 
software lets/will let me 
access my accounts quickly 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
PE4 
I save/will save time by 
using password 
management software 
Self-generated 
PE5 
Password management 
software optimizes/will 
optimize operations related 
to my accounts 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
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Table II (Continued). Items used for the research 
 
FC1 
I have all the necessary 
resources towards using 
password management 
software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
FC2 
I have the necessary know-
how towards using 
password management 
software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
FC3 
If I have any difficulty using 
password management 
software, I do have a 
support to help me 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
BI1 
I have the intention of 
managing my passwords by 
using the password 
management software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
BI2 
I’m curious about password 
management software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
BI3 
I have the intention of 
managing my accounts 
using a password 
management software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
BI4 
I have the intention of 
logging in with the help of a 
password management 
software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
BI5 
I plan to use a password 
management software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
Adopt1 
I use password management 
software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
Adopt2 
I use password management 
software to manage my 
passwords 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
Adopt3 
I use password management 
software for logging to 
various systems/accounts 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
Adopt4 
I subscribe to products that 
are exclusive to password 
management software 
Oliveira et al, 2014 
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Table III. Statistical Values of Items 
 
 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Excess 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
EE1 3,962 4 1 5 0,885 0,529 -0,78 
EE2 3,819 4 1 5 0,906 0,127 -0,523 
EE3 3,721 4 1 5 0,901 0,113 -0,507 
EE4 3,223 3 1 5 1,088 -0,639 -0,134 
SI1 2,747 3 1 5 1,085 -0,592 0,107 
SI2 2,623 3 1 5 1,195 -0,805 0,215 
SI3 2,649 3 1 5 1,185 -0,794 0,202 
SI4 2,449 2 1 5 1,135 -0,687 0,313 
SI5 2,26 2 1 5 1,124 -0,715 0,45 
SI6 2,272 2 1 5 1,229 -0,756 0,573 
SI7 1,638 1 1 5 1,015 1,77 1,601 
FC1 3,426 4 1 5 1,23 -0,787 -0,405 
FC2 3,411 4 1 5 1,216 -0,758 -0,437 
FC3 3,17 3 1 5 1,158 -0,703 -0,204 
BI1 2,977 3 1 5 1,291 -1,1 -0,042 
BI2 3,475 4 1 5 1,179 -0,446 -0,56 
BI3 3,045 3 1 5 1,288 -1,057 -0,074 
B4 3,026 3 1 5 1,287 -1,104 -0,049 
BI5 2,989 3 1 5 1,333 -1,162 -0,027 
PE1 3,706 4 1 5 1,055 -0,114 -0,629 
PE2 3,785 4 1 5 1 0,336 -0,743 
P3 3,796 4 1 5 0,992 -0,017 -0,56 
PE4 3,611 4 1 5 1,128 -0,556 -0,462 
PE5 3,442 3 1 5 1,034 -0,261 -0,285 
TaskC1 3,555 4 1 5 1,218 -0,697 -0,518 
TaskC2 3,917 4 1 5 1,078 -0,066 -0,851 
TaskC3 4,185 4 1 5 0,967 1,073 -1,209 
TaskC4 3,83 4 1 5 1,231 -0,75 -0,674 
TaskC5 4,211 4 1 5 0,968 0,864 -1,189 
TaskC6 3,981 4 1 5 1,151 0,219 -1,024 
TaskC7 2,857 3 1 5 1,423 -1,321 0,152 
TC1 3,645 4 1 5 1,036 -0,393 -0,352 
TC2 3,642 4 1 5 0,95 -0,227 -0,318 
TC3 3,404 3 1 5 0,951 -0,234 -0,172 
TC4 3,664 4 1 5 0,901 -0,284 -0,219 
TTF1 3,6 4 1 5 0,997 -0,639 -0,186 
TTF2 3,46 3 1 5 1,078 -0,617 -0,197 
TTF3 3,449 3 1 5 1,049 -0,549 -0,17 
TTF4 3,234 3 1 5 1,181 -0,917 -0,158 
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Table III (Continued). Statistical Values of Items 
 
Adopt1 2,102 1 1 5 1,53 -0,599 1,017 
Adopt2 2,125 1 1 5 1,518 -0,6 0,998 
Adopt3 2,132 1 1 5 1,508 -0,565 1,003 
Adopt4 1,551 1 1 5 0,902 1,255 1,476 
 
